

# **Power-sharing after Civil War**

*an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite  
Cooperation in Mostar and Brcko*

**Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen**



Master's Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

The Faculty of Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

2006

## **Acknowledgements**

Working on this thesis has been an interesting and instructive process. It has given me the opportunity to gain in-depth insights into a complex problem area. It has provided me with personal growth and valuable insights into the art of conducting science.

Several people deserve to be mentioned for their help, contribution and support in the process of writing the thesis. Thanks to staff at the Office of the High Representative in Mostar (OHR South) for documents and help. Thanks to Finn Lynghjem, former OHR deputy in Mostar and Robert Farrand, former Brcko supervisor for sharing their experiences with me. Thanks to Helge Lurås at the OHR office in Sarajevo for having given me access to talk to a number of persons that in an early phase of the thesis project gave me valuable insights peacebuilding in Bosnia Herzegovina.

My supervisor Kari Osland at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) has always been patient and flexible, for which I am grateful. I appreciate her encouragements and ability to create an open good positive atmosphere where challenges have been discussed and advices provided. I want to express my gratitude to Arnhild Grønvik and Stephanie Bjøro for their constructive comments and inspiration. I also want to express my respect for and thanks to the program coordinator at the Peace and Conflict study programme, Anne Julie Semb for her interest in her students and her ability to inspire. Thanks to the staff at the library at Lillehammer University College (HiL) for always being helpful and service minded. Last, but not least, I want to thank Ola. Thank you for your patience and encouragements— thank you for the music – and everything else you are bringing. Thank you for having followed me on this long and winding road.

## Table of contents

<b>1. INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE.....	1
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	3
1.3. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS.....	4
1.4. METHODOLOGY.....	5
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS.....	9
<b>2. BACKGROUND: WAR AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN MOSTAR AND BRCKO – THE BACKGROUND OF THE POWER-SHARING AGREEMENTS.....</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1. MOSTAR PRIOR TO AND DURING THE WAR.....	11
2.2. MOSTAR UNDER EU ADMINISTRATION AND THE ROAD TO THE INTERIM STATUTE.....	13
2.3. BRCKO PRIOR TO AND DURING THE WAR.....	15
2.4. BRCKO ARBITRATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY REGIME.....	17
<b>3. THEORETICAL APPROACH: POWER-SHARING THEORY AND INTER- ETHNIC ELITE COOPERATION.....</b>	<b>18</b>
3.1. THE POWER-SHARING APPROACH IN CONFLICT LITERATURE.....	18
3.1.1. <i>Opposing strategies for conflict management in the conflict literature.....</i>	18
3.1.2. <i>Two models of power-sharing: consociational and the integrative model.....</i>	19
3.2. CONSOCIATIONALISM: LIJPHART’S APPROACH TO INTER-ETHNIC ELITE COOPERATION.....	20
3.2.1. <i>Inter-ethnic elite cooperation through institutionalised security.....</i>	20
3.2.2. <i>Security mechanisms that promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation.....</i>	21
3.2.3. <i>Why will elites cooperate across ethnic lines when political security is guaranteed?.....</i>	23
3.3. THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL: HOROWITZ’ APPROACH TO INTER-ETHNIC ELITE COOPERATION.....	24
3.3.1. <i>Inter-ethnic elite cooperation through integrative dynamics.....</i>	24
3.3.2. <i>Integrative dynamics that promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation.....</i>	24
3.3.3. <i>Horowitz’ critique of Lijphart’s elite assumptions.....</i>	26
3.4. BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES.....	27
3.5. CHALLENGES TO THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....	28
<b>4. THE POWER-SHARING AGREEMENTS OF MOSTAR AND BRCKO.....</b>	<b>30</b>
4.1. TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF POWER STIPULATED IN MOSTAR AND BRCKO STATUES.....	30
4.1.1. <i>Territorial division of power in Mostar.....</i>	30
4.1.2. <i>Territorial division of power in Brcko.....</i>	32
4.2. RULES OF REPRESENTATION.....	33
4.2.1. <i>Electoral system and reserved seats in Mostar.....</i>	33
4.2.2. <i>Electoral system and reserved seats in Brcko.....</i>	35
4.3. DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES AND VETO RIGHTS.....	36
4.3.1. <i>Decision-making procedures and veto rights in Mostar.....</i>	36
4.3.2. <i>Decision-making procedures and veto rights in Brcko.....</i>	37
4.4. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS.....	37

<b>5. INTER-ETHNIC ELITE COOPERATION IN MOSTAR AND BRCKO</b>	39
5.1. INTER-ETHNIC ELITE COOPERATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONS	39
5.1.1. <i>Establishment of the City Council, the City Government and the City-                 Municipality Councils in Mostar</i>	40
5.1.2. <i>Establishment of the District Assembly and the District Government in Brcko</i>	44
5.1.3. <i>Theory and practice: inter-ethnic elite cooperation and the establishment of                 power-sharing institutions</i>	46
5.2. ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND ELITE RESPONSES TO REPRESENTATION RULES	48
5.2.1. <i>The Mostar 2000 Municipality election</i>	48
5.2.2. <i>The Brcko 2004 Municipal elections</i>	50
5.2.3. <i>Theory and practice: inter-ethnic elite cooperation and electoral dynamics</i>	52
5.3. FUNCTIONALITY OF THE INSTITUTIONS	53
5.3.1. <i>Elite cooperation and functionality of the Mostar institutions 1997-2004</i>	53
5.3.2. <i>Elite cooperation and functionality of the Brcko institutions 2000-2005</i>	56
5.3.3. <i>Theory and practice – elite cooperation and functionality of power-sharing                 institutions</i>	58
<b>6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</b>	60
6.1. THE MECHANISMS AND PRINCIPLES IN THE MOSTAR AND BRCKO STATUES – A CONSOCIATIONAL OR INTEGRATIVE STRUCTURE?	60
6.2. INTER-ETHNIC ELITE COOPERATION IN MOSTAR AND BRCKO	61
6.3. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND ELITE COOPERATION – AN EXTENDED THEORETICAL MODEL	63
<b>7. BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	65
<b>8. APPENDIX</b>	

## LIST of TABLES

<i>Table 3.1 Summary of institutional mechanisms in the power-sharing models.....</i>	27
<i>Table 4.1 Territorial division of power, Mostar and Brcko.....</i>	32
<i>Table 4.2 Composition of the six City-Municipality Councils.....</i>	34
<i>Table 4.3 Rules of representation, Mostar and Brcko.....</i>	36
<i>Table 4.4 Veto provisions, Mostar and Brcko.....</i>	37
<i>Table 4.5 Summary of the institutional structures, Mostar and Brcko.....</i>	38
<i>Table 6.1 Summary of the institutional structures, Mostar and Brcko.....</i>	61

# **1. Introduction**

## **1.1 Background and rationale**

When the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina (GFAP), also known as the Dayton peace agreement, ended the civil wars in Bosnia Herzegovina (hereafter BiH or Bosnia) in November 1995, the situation in many Bosnian cities was still tense and the future stability uncertain. In Mostar and Brcko the situation was particularly instable. The two cities were divided along ethnic lines and the task to reunite the cities politically and administratively was seen as a tremendous challenge. Political elites who not long before had fought against each other were now meant to cooperate within common institutions. The aim of this thesis is twofold, 1) to present and examine the principles behind the institutional system for local governance in the two cities after the civil war, but 2) also to discuss which of the structures that most effectively have contributed to the promotion of cooperation between the local political elites.

Within the conflict literature there is a broad consensus that inter-ethnic elite cooperation is of vital importance in order to restore peace and to manage ethnic differences in post-civil war transitions. There are, however, divergent views on what kind of institutions and mechanisms are most effective in bringing such cooperation about. One perspective, the consociationalist camp, argues that institutions have to offer political security through a group-based institutional structure that make ethnicity and group protection as the fundamental determining principle. The opposing perspective, which is found in the integrative camp, argues that institutional structures have to offer motivating incentives for cooperation through institutions that seek to obliterate the ethnic divide.

This thesis is formulated in the context of these opposing viewpoints and the debate between the two approaches. The aim is to investigate the merits of the institutional

structures in Mostar and Brcko in contributing to inter-ethnic elite cooperation and thereby provide insights into the relations between institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation.

The rationale for undertaking this study is three-fold: firstly, both the consociationalist and the integrative arguments have been criticised for lacking empirical support. This study seeks to contribute with empirical data that systematically compares the validity of the approaches.

Secondly, the two models were developed in the Cold War era, and the assumptions related to elite motivation and elite behaviour are founded on ethnic divided societies with a different character and a different actor picture than the Post-Cold War era contained. After the Cold War, international actors have become directly engaged in conflict management and peace restoration. Studies of the consociational and integrative structures in this context have been undertaken, but few have taken into consideration the international actor dimension of contemporary conflict. An analysis of Mostar and Brcko, where international actors have played important roles, provides a good opportunity to outline propositions of how IC affect the inherent mechanisms of factual structures.

Thirdly, many studies have focused on the potential of the models to achieve stability and democracy. Few have, however, focused on the mechanisms inherent in the models which is meant to bring this about; the cooperation between elites. This can be seen as a shortcoming, and a study focusing on this step in the theories is overdue.

A comparative study of post-war Mostar and Brcko will contribute insights on all these three fields and thus, the hope is, provide valuable insight into power-sharing theory.

## **1.2 Research questions**

This study of institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko will be conducted through a two-step analysis:

The first step will be to determine whether the Mostar and Brcko institutional structures can be placed within the consociational or the integrative theoretical paradigms. This will be done through an examination of the foundation documents that devise the institutional structures for the cities, the Mostar Interim Statute issued in 1996 and the Brcko District Statute issued in 2000.

The first research question set to answer is:

1) Which elements of the two theoretical models of power-sharing can be identified in the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko District Statute?

The second step will be devoted to examining the relation between the institutional structure devised and level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation among the political elites in the two cities. The question set to answer is:

2) Of the institutional structures in respectively Mostar and Brcko, which contributed most effectively to the promotion of cooperation between the local elites?

The Mostar Interim Statute was issued in February 1996. In 2004 a new statute entered into force. The period examined with regard to the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar is the period under the institutional system defined by the 1996 Interim Statute, from February 1996 to 2004. The Brcko District Statute was issued in March 2000. This statute is final and is still the foundation of the institutional system in Brcko. The period examined with regard to the level of inter-ethnic cooperation in Brcko is the period since the enactment of the Brcko Statute, from March 2000 to 2005.



### 1.3 Conceptual clarifications and delimitations

*Institutional structure* is a wide concept and needs to be clarified. For the purpose of this thesis, institutional structure is meant to refer to the political local institutions that either can be seen as consociational or integrative institutions.

Three elements of institutional structure will be emphasised:

i) the principle for territorial division of power, ii) the rules and mechanisms for representation and iii) decision-making rules and veto provisions. These three mechanisms will be used to determine whether the over-all structure in Mostar and Brcko is consociational or integrative.

*Elite cooperation* between different segments (Lijphart 1977) or between different ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985) is a prevalent feature both in consociational theory and in the integrative approach. Neither Lijphart nor Horowitz provide any explicit definition of what they mean by elite cooperation. Implicitly, however, they see elite cooperation through the act of moderating nationalist claims and seeking consensus (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985). Caspersen (2004: 570) defines *inter-ethnic elite cooperation* as “willingness and acceptance on the part of political leaders to compromise and to rule inclusively rather than exclusively”. This definition is adopted in the following because it both captures the initial meaning of Lijphart and Horowitz and because it is measurable.

The degree of inclusive or exclusive behaviour and the level of compromise will be determined through an examination of three processes and aspects dependent on inter-ethnic elite cooperation: i) the process to establish the institutions ii) Elite responses to electoral dynamics and rules of representation and iii) the over-all functionality of the institutions. The reason for choosing these three aspects rests on the assumption that if the establishment process was long and difficult, the level of inter-ethnic cooperation was low. If elites responded negatively to electoral dynamics, the level of inter-ethnic

elite cooperation was low. If the institutions did not function, the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation was also low.

This thesis is formulated within the power-sharing tradition in conflict literature. The concept of *power-sharing* can be understood narrowly or broadly. Lijphart has adopted a narrow understanding and sees power-sharing as equivalent to consociationalism (1977: 25). Caspersen (2004) share Lijphart's understanding. This narrow understanding excludes Horowitz integrative model from the power-sharing concept.

In this thesis a broad understanding of the concept of power-sharing is adopted. This is in line with Horowitz (1985) Timothy Sisk (1996), Harris and Reilly (1998) and the Carnegie Project group (2001/2002). In their understanding power-sharing is “those political systems that foster governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, mobilized ethnic groups in society” (Sisk 1996: 4). Sisk includes the integrative model as a power-sharing approach. In the same way, Harris and Reilly (1998: 141) argue that “the consociational and integrative approaches can be fruitfully viewed as opposite poles in a spectrum of power-sharing institutions and practices”.<sup>1</sup> This interpretation is adopted in this thesis, accordingly power-sharing hereafter refers to both the consociational and integrative models.<sup>2</sup>

Both consociationalism and the integrative approach have developed over a period of time, and many scholars have come to regard themselves as consociationalists or integrativist. When presenting the models in this thesis, the writings of Lijphart and Horowitz will be the points of reference. This is because they are regarded as the scholars who initially coined the consociational and integrative models. As of yet they are still regarded as the key spokesmen of the models.

## 1.4 Methodology

### *The comparative case study*

---

<sup>1</sup> These viewpoints are based on the argument that also the integrative mechanisms and the integrative approach over-ell, seek to promote government coalitions that are broadly inclusive of all ethnic groups, but through different mechanisms than the consociational approach (Carnegie Project 2001/2002).

<sup>2</sup> “Models” and “approach” will be used interchangeably.

The research design applied in this thesis is a comparative case study. A case-study is an empirical enquiry that looks into a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 2003: 13). According to Charles Ragin, the goal of comparison is to *explain* and *interpret* macro-social variation (1987: 5) (my emphasis).

This corresponds to the aims of this thesis; on the one hand, I will identify and explain which theoretical elements that can be found in the power-sharing agreements in Brcko and Mostar. On the other, I will interpret the relation between the institutional structures and the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. As previously outlined, the over-reaching purpose of this investigation is to examine the competing proposition related to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation proposed by consociational theory and the integrative model.

### *Selection of cases*

The cities of Mostar and Brcko are selected as the empirical cases for investigation in this thesis. The cases are selected because they share some similar features, but also contrast each-other on some points, which make them interesting cases for a comparison. Among the similarities between the cases that makes them interesting to compare with relation to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation, is that the war had some of the same effects on both cities; in both Mostar and Brcko the population and settlement patterns had been altered due to the war. Both cities had become divided in 'ethnic' zones where each ethnic group controlled each zone and established their own institutional structures. In both cities the war-time parallel structures proved resistant and reintegration of political-administrative structures immediately after the signing of the Dayton agreement was seen as a challenge by international observers.

Among the differences that are interesting in relation to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation are the differences in international strategies. While international actors in Brcko were directly involved in political life through an international transitional administration until 2004, the international transitional administration of Mostar ended in 1996. This difference makes it possible through an

comparison of Mostar and Brcko to outline some propositions about how the international dimension has affected the relation between institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation.

### *The comparative case study and modes of generalisation*

A general objection to the case-study design is the lack of ability to produce general knowledge. *Statistical generalisation*, that is “an inference made about a population (or universe) on the basis of empirical data collected about a sample” (Yin 2003: 32) is not possible to make based on a case-study, and indeed not the aim. Cases can not be seen as ‘sampling units’, rather they are unique categories and due to this, the mode of generalisation is restricted. While Mostar and Brcko represent some of the general developments and challenges faced by a number of local divided cities and municipalities, data and analyses from this study are only meant to provide information about these particular empirical situations.

*Analytical generalisations*, however, is a type of generalisation that the case-study framework can provide. Analytical generalisation is related to the use and development of theory, “a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case-study” (Ibid). This gives room for engaging in a theoretical debate on a particular field, and based on a comparative case study contribute with insights of importance related to the strength, validity and evolution of the theory. As previously mentioned, this is an aim with this study.

### *Sources and data collection*

Due to the nature of the case study design where the opportunity to use several sources of evidence is present and due to the need to maximize the validity of a study within such a framework, data triangulation is a strategy often used and encouraged (Ibid: 97-101). Data triangulation refers to exploring several sources of information and evidence (ibid). This strategy is employed in this thesis and both primary and secondary sources have been obtained through documentary review, archival research and interviewing.

Primary sources employed are the Dayton Peace Agreement and its annexes (1995) the Interim Agreement for the City of Mostar (1996) (hereafter the Mostar Statute) the Brcko District Final Award (2000), The Statute for the Brcko District (2000) (hereafter the Brcko District Statute). In addition to these official agreements, election results from municipal elections in 1997, 2000 and 2004 are employed, as well as press releases from the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

The secondary sources relied on in this thesis have different forms and variants. A useful source has been the Office of the High Representative media round up archive.<sup>3</sup> The archive contains articles from BiH newspapers from 1999 till today. Every day is covered. The rationale for using relevant articles related to political life in Brcko and Mostar from this archive is that they offer detailed information on developments from day to day. Thus, offers the opportunity to follow the detailed developments in relevant cases and gives in depth insights into processes in addition to outcome.

The advantages of the archive are that it is relatively extensive, articles from several newspapers are found either in full text or in a summary form. In addition, the articles are translated into English, which make them accessible also for non-Bosnian speaking persons. However, it has to be emphasised that in the translation process, information may have been lost, in addition only a selection of articles is included. In spite of these shortcomings, I found the archive to be a useful source of information, and the disadvantages mentioned are taken into account.

Another useful source of information has is reports and evaluations produced by international actors present in BiH. In particular, the High Representative's reports to the UN Secretary General and the Brcko supervisor's annual reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) have been useful. Moreover, both developments in Brcko and Mostar have gained attention from independent think-tanks and research groups. International Crisis Group (ICG) and European Stability Initiative (ESI)

---

<sup>3</sup> The archive can be found on: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

reports have been consulted, in addition to other books and articles that examine developments in BiH in general and Mostar and Brcko in particular.

In addition, two interviews have been conducted in the last part of the data collection process. My informants were Mr. Robert Farrand, international Supervisor in Brcko from March 1997 to June 2000 and Mr. Finn Lynghjem, Head of the Regional Office of the High Representative (South) in Mostar from January 2000 to January 2001. The aim with the interviews was to complement already obtained information. The interview with Mr. Farrand was conducted by e-mail. Interviewing by e-mail has disadvantages compared to interviewing in person. It is a limited provider of information since the dialogue is replaced by monologue, it is only possible to get written data and you lose the advantage of nuance in the interview. In spite of this, I found the e-mail interview to be an informative approach, which has supplemented the other data in a fruitful way. The interview with Mr. Lynghjem was a telephone interview. It was formulated as an open interview, where the aim was to cross-check the information obtained by other sources related to Mostar in the period 2000-2001 and to get Mr. Lynghjem's elaboration on some of the points.

## **1.5 Structure of the thesis**

This chapter has introduced the research questions, the background and rationale for this study and its methodological approach. Chapter 2 will briefly describe the situations in Mostar and Brcko before, during and immediately after the war. The aim is to provide an overview of the contexts and situations in which the power-sharing agreements for the two cities were signed. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of this thesis. It starts with a presentation of the power-sharing approach to conflict management, before turning to Lijphart's and Horowitz' approaches to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation. The chapter ends with an outline of two analytic models derived from the two theoretical approaches and with pointing at challenges to the theoretical framework. Chapter 4 and 5 provide an

analysis of institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko. Chapter 4 is devoted to an examination of the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko Statute. It seeks to answer which elements of the theoretical models that can be identified in the two statutes, providing an answer to the first research question posed. Chapter 5 goes on to discuss the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko in order to investigate which of the institutional structures devised that most effectively contributed to the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation, providing and answer to the second research question posed. In chapter 6, the findings from the empirical analysis will be summarised and a conclusion provided.

## **2. Background: War and international intervention in Mostar and Brcko – the background of the power-sharing agreements**

The purpose of this chapter is to present the background for the signing of the power-sharing agreements in Mostar and Brcko and to provide a brief presentation of Mostar and Brcko prior to, during and immediately after the civil war. This chapter first gives a brief account of Mostar before and during the war, and thereafter describes the establishment of the international administration in the city and the road to the Interim Statute, signed in 1996. Thereafter, the situations in Brcko prior to and during the war are briefly accounted for before turning to the establishment of the international supervisory regime and the background for the Brcko District Statute, issued in March 2000.

### **2.1 Mostar prior to and during the war**

Before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 Mostar was an economic, political and cultural centre. The Mostar Valley was a significant industrial area with factories producing helicopters, aluminium, beverages, clothes and agricultural products. The main river of the Herzegovina region, the Nerevta, divided the city into two unequal parts, the greater and more developed West and the smaller and hilly East (Reichel 2000: 2). Historically, the city had been the chief administrative city of the Ottoman Empire in the Herzegovina region from the late 15<sup>th</sup> century before becoming a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878. Mostar became part of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of World War I.

In 1991, there were 76,000 inhabitants in the city, of whom 34 per cent were Bosniac, 29 per cent Croat and 19 per cent Serb. The remaining 18 per cent chose the supranational identification of 'Yugoslav'. The whole of the Mostar municipality area, including the town's surrounding cluster of villages, had 126,000 inhabitants – 35 per



cent Bosniacs, 34 per cent Croats, 20 per cent Serbs and 11 per cent Yugoslav.<sup>4</sup> In the town of Mostar about 6,000 Croats lived among the east bank's nearly 35,000 residents. At least 15,000 Bosniacs were among the 45,000-plus on the west bank. Large minorities of Serbs were spread across both sides of the city. Thus, Serbs, Muslims and Croats lived intermixed in a city with one of the most multiethnic population structures in Bosnian (Bose 2002: 98).

Due to its multiethnic population and historical heritage, Mostar had for decades symbolized the very idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a blend of South Slavic, Ottoman Turkish and Mediterranean cultural traditions could exist side by side, and where Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim people lived distinctively, but together and in mutual tolerance (Silber and Little 1996: 291). The outbreak of war in BiH in early 1992 and the subsequent three years with civil war in the country dramatically changed this picture of Mostar.

The outbreak of war in BiH was a consequence of and a part of the dissolution of the Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>5</sup> Since 1991, after the declaration of independence of the Croatian and Slovene republics, the Balkans became destabilised and war between the newly independent states and Serbia broke out. BiH was recognised by the EU on 6 April 1992, and at the same time the war broke out between Bosnian Serbs, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats.<sup>6</sup>

Following the declaration of independence of BiH, the Yugoslav People Army (JNA) gradually established control over Mostar and kept the city under siege for nine months before the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and Bosniac military groups jointly drove out the Serbs.<sup>7</sup> Then the Croats turned against the Bosniacs and began a

---

<sup>4</sup> The numbers are from the 1991 census and referred to in Bose (2002: 99-100).

<sup>5</sup> A number of books analyzes and describes the break up of Yugoslavia and the civil wars in the Balkan. See for instance Woodward (1995); Silber and Little (1996); Mønnesland (1999); and Gallagher (2003).

<sup>6</sup> The political goals of the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, backed by Serbia and Croatia, respectively was to establish ethnically homogenous territories which would eventually become part of Serbia and Croatia, and to divide the ethnically mixed BiH between a Serbian and a Croat part. The goal of the Bosnian Government, which was controlled by the Bosniacs, was the territorial integrity of BiH, since Bosniacs were a majority in BiH and had most to lose from partition (Kaldor 2001: 33).

<sup>7</sup> For a good account of military groups and structures, see Kaldor (2001: 44-57).

bloody ten-month 'war within the war'. Both groups came to claim the city as a place of cultural heritage, and used torture, forced expulsion, rape and murder the fightings (Reichel 2000: 2).

The Bosniac-Croat fighting ended with the Washington-agreement (March 1994) which established the Muslim-Croat Federation in BiH. Despite end of fighting, the situation in Mostar was tense and instable. Compared to before the war, Mostar was unrecognizable. The town centre was totally destroyed and the city divided between Bosniac and Croat controlled areas. The Bosniacs controlled most of the east-bank of the Nerevta river, while the Croats had control over most of the west-bank (Bose 2002: 104).

The demographic composition of the city and the population patterns had changed dramatically. In the Bosniac-controlled zone only a few dozen Croats, out of approximately 6,000 before the war, remained (Ibid: 105). About 85 per cent of the 45,000-plus Bosniacs who had lived in what had become the HVO-controlled zone had either fled or been expelled. Fewer than a thousand Serbs remained in the city, of an urban Serb population of perhaps 20,000 in 1991 (Ibid). Politically, the HVO and HDZ controlled the western part, while SDA controlled the eastern part of the city. Both claimed and wanted to control more. Against the background of the tense situation, the presence of international actors was necessary in order to re-establish Mostar as a secure multiethnic city.

## **2.2 Mostar under EU administration and the road to the Interim Statute.**

The international organisation given a leading role in Mostar was the EU. Shortly after the Washington agreement in March 1994 a special interim European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) was established.<sup>8</sup> The EUAM drew its mandate from the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on 5 July 1994 by the EU,

---

<sup>8</sup> The administration was in place in July 1994 and was headed by the German Hans Koschnick, former social-democrat mayor of Bremen. He was the Head of the administration to March 1996.

The Western European Union (WEU) member states, the two mayors of Mostar, the Bosniac Safet Orucevic and the Croat Miljo Brajkovic as well as Alija Izetbegovic, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic for the Federation and Jadranko Prlic as the representative of the Bosnian Croats.

The EUAM was stipulated to last for maximum two years and to assist and supervise the process of physical and economic reconstruction, refugee and displaced people return and generally assist in return to normal life in the city (MoU 1994). In addition was the over-reaching task and aim “to contribute to a climate leading to a single, self-sustaining, multiethnic administration” (MoU 1994). This latter responsibility was in particular a great challenge for the administration. Mostar was physically divided in a Croat and a Bosniac controlled zone. A system of parallel Croat and Bosniac political institutions and structures had been established during the war. To integrate these institutions into one system of local governance met resistance among the political elites.

After a series of negotiations, the Interim Statute for the City of Mostar, issued 20 February 1996 was accepted.<sup>9</sup> The agreement contained a detailed description of the form of one common system of local governance for the city based on power-sharing between the Croats, Bosniacs and ‘others’. The new structure was to be established through local elections, which were held in June 1996. The mandate of the EUAM ended in January 1997 and an EU Special Envoy was appointed to oversee the process to form the institutions after the elections and to assist in the process.

Now, Mostar’s period under direct international administration was over, and the main responsibility to implement the Interim Statute and reintegrate the city’s political and administrative structure, rested on the local politicians but under continued

---

<sup>9</sup> Before reaching the Interim Statute, Mostar’s administration was mentioned in the Madrid Agreement about Mostar (24 October 1995), in the Dayton Peace Accord (annex) (10 November 1995), in the Rome agreement (18 February 1996). For a comparison of the suggestions in the Rome Agreement compared to the Interim Statute, see ICG report (2000).

international surveillance through the establishment of the OHR regional office in Mostar.

### **2.3 Brcko prior to and during the war**

Before the war the Brcko area had developed into as an agriculture and – because of its proximity to the Sava River and its link to the Tuzla Basin – a transportation centre for wood, coal, anthracite, agriculture/animal products and chemicals.

Due to its location, the Brcko area had historically “represented a cross-roads between peoples and empires” (Reichel 2000: 9).<sup>10</sup> As a result, the area has been the home of a mix of Serb, Croat, Bosnian and other ethnic groups. Orthodox Christian, Catholic and ‘Muslim’ religions had existed side by side for centuries. Especially Brcko city was prior to the war known for its multi-ethnicity. 40,000 people lived in the city, among these 55 per cent were Bosniacs, 20 per cent Serbs and 7 per cent Croats. 18 per cent were Yugoslavs and others. The population living in the towns and villages in the rest of Brcko municipality was a plurality Croat (42 per cent), followed by Bosniacs (34 per cent) and Serbs (21 per cent) (Dahlman and Tuathail 2004: 1).<sup>11</sup>

When hostilities erupted between Serbia and Croatia in 1991, the town of Brcko which housed a Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) barrack was in the centre of the conflict. Brcko was not, however, a typical Serb war plan target. The Serb plans focused on consolidating control over areas considered to be currently or historically Serb.<sup>12</sup> Rather, Brcko was targeted for purely strategic reasons. Due to its location, in a strategically necessary overland route between the Serb areas in the west and east of

---

<sup>10</sup> In 1699, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Sava River became the border between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. For the next two centuries, Brcko represented the western-most reach of the Ottoman Empire. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, however, remained under Ottoman sovereignty until 1908, when this too was assumed by Austria-Hungary (Reichel 2000: 9).

<sup>11</sup> The numbers are from the 1991 census, referred to in Dahlman and Tuathail (2004) and cited with permission from the authors.

<sup>12</sup> Such as the areas Western Bosnia and the Drina River valley in Eastern Bosnia. Claims to land were typically founded on either current or historic Serb majorities and, in some cases vague historical legends, including the notion that most Bosniacs were really Serb.

Bosnia, it was seen as important for the Serbs to gain control over Brcko (Siber and Little 1996).

In late 1991 Serb para-military troops arrived in Brcko and began to trail local Serb volunteers. At the same time, the JNA confiscated weapons from the Bosnian Territorial Defence Force in Brcko. In April 1992, Serb forces – composed of JNA regular and irregular forces – began their assaults on Brcko and destroyed the roads and rail bridges over the Sava River. The Serb forces encountered limited resistance in the town. After six days of fighting Serb forces had taken control of the city and the area extending several kilometres south and west of the town (Reichel 2000: 10). The rest of the Brcko municipality was defended in a cooperative effort by Bosniac and Croat armies. The local relations between the Croat and Bosniac armies apparently survived the larger Bosniac-Croat war that raged in central Bosnia from 1992 until the Washington agreement that formed the basis for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) in March 1994 (Dahlman and Toal 2004: 9).

At the time of the final cease-fire and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, Brcko municipality was divided by a frontline that had remained more or less stationary for three years. In the northern part of the municipality, the Serbs retained military control through the wartime administration run by local Serb Democratic Party (SDS) politicians and their allies. The southern part of the municipality was further divided between Croat and Bosniac armies loyal to the Croat democratic Union (HDZ) and Party for Democratic Action (SDA) leadership, respectively (Ibid).

As in Mostar, the demographical composition of the population had changed dramatically. Over 30,000 Bosniac and Croat residents had been driven out of the Serb controlled areas, while about 55,000 Serbs displaced from the FBiH had been encouraged to go to Brcko in search for “abandoned” apartments (Ibid: 2).

## **2.4 Brcko arbitration and the international supervisory regime**

Contrary to the future of Mostar, for which the Dayton agreement contained some general lines, the future of Brcko was left unsolved. During the peace negotiations all parties agreed that whether Brcko should be governed by the FBiH or the Serbian Republic (RS) should be left to international arbitration with a final decision to be made within a year (GFAP 1995: annex 2, Art. 5). When this overreaching question was settled, an administrative governance structure that took into account the ethnic division of the city should be decided. In 1999 the arbitral tribunal declared that Brcko should neither be governed by the FBiH or the RS. Instead, Brcko was established as an autonomous District, only subordinate to the state level (Final Award 1999).

As a part of the four year long arbitration process it was decided to establish an international supervisory regime in Brcko, headed by the OHR. In March 1997 U.S Ambassador Robert Farrand was appointed to be the international supervisor of Brcko. The supervisor was given wide authorities. His overarching task was to oversee and assist in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Brcko. More specifically, one of his main tasks was to prepare a “statute of District Government” and a detailed plan and schedule for the formation of a District Government (Final Award 1999: Para. 38). The statute was issued 7 December 1999 and enacted in March 2000. It contained a detailed plan for the institutional structure of the District based on power-sharing.

This chapter has described the contexts and the background for the agreements that stipulate the administrative and governance structures of Brcko and Mostar. In both cities, the aim with the institutions stipulated in the statutes was to reintegrate political institutions that had been divided along ethnic lines during the war. Both agreements were based on the concept of power-sharing. In the next chapter theories of power-sharing and elite cooperation will be presented.

### **3. Theoretical approach: power-sharing theory and inter-ethnic elite cooperation**

This thesis is formulated in the framework of two distinct theories of power-sharing; the consociational theory, as presented by Arend Lijphart and the integrative approach, as presented by Donald Horowitz. This chapter will first provide a presentation of the basic arguments inherent in power-sharing. Thereafter, Lijphart's consociational theory and Horowitz integrative model will be presented with emphasis on their approaches to institutional mechanism and inter-ethnic elite cooperation. In the end of the chapter, Lijphart's and Horowitz' approaches will be summarised, and the different expectations that can be derived from the theoretical models will be discussed, in order to challenge, but also establish, an analytic framework.

#### **3.1 The power-sharing approach in conflict literature**

##### **3.1.1 Opposing strategies for conflict management in the conflict literature**

Within the literature on conflict resolution and conflict management there are divergent views on how to deal with conflicts in ethnically heterogeneous states in cases where the division has led to outbreaks of violence and civil wars.

One perspective sees restoration of peace, stability and democracy as impossible unless strategies that are designed to achieve a correspondence between the population's ethno-political allegiances and the borders of the state are put into practice. One such strategy is to "rightsize" states, i.e., adjusting state boundaries or creating new states (Hoppe 1998; O'Leary, Lustick and Callaghy 2001). Another strategy, eagerly endorsed by among others Chaim Kaufmann, is "forcible partition" or even population transfers (Kaufmann 1996; 1998 and 1999; Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997). According to them, ethnic violence implies

that civil politics can not be restored unless “ethnic groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves” (Kaufman 1996: 137).<sup>13</sup>

The strategies proposed by partition theory have been challenged on moral, practical and legal grounds: a number of researchers have focused on how to manage ethnic conflicts while protecting the existing state boundaries (Lijphart 2002 and 2004; Carley 1997; Horowitz, 1985: 588-92 and 1997: 435; Kumar 1997; Sambanis 2000; Gurr 1993: 290-292). Scholars within this stand are arguing that stability and democracy is achievable in ethnic divided states through mechanisms that can accommodate the need both of majority and minority groups.<sup>14</sup> Common for the mechanisms they suggest is that they are meant to cope with and decrease the security dilemma in ethnic divided societies through some form of power-sharing between the different groups.

### **3.1.2 Two models of power-sharing: Consociational theory and the integrative model**

Within the power-sharing approach tradition the two of the main theoretical models are consociational democracy and the integrative model. The consociational approach is closely connected to the writings of Arend Lijphart. He presented his arguments in 1969, later in the book “*Democracy in Plural Societies*” in 1977 and since then in a number of books and articles. The alternative, integrative model was coined by Donald Horowitz with the book “*Ethnic Groups in Conflict*” in 1985.

Both of the models were originally developed in order to explain types of group accommodation in selected fragmented societies in Western Europe and the nation-building processes of pluralistic (Lijphart 1977) or deeply divided (Horowitz 1985)

---

<sup>13</sup> These arguments are not new. John Stuart Mill (1860: 230) argued that democracy is “next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities”. The line of argumentation of today’s proponents of partition and separation is mainly based on the security dilemma (Sambanis 2000: 438) “The dilemma in its purest form arises when one community faces a distrustful other and one’s own actions to increase one’s own security is perceived as threatening the security of others” (Jervis 1978). The security dilemma is originally a central feature of realist International Relations thinking, originally seen as a feature of the system of international relations, but have been transferred to a civil war context on the basis of the characters of civil wars (Posan: 1993).

<sup>14</sup> Such mechanisms can be federalism, different forms of autonomy, institutional provisions that ensure representation for all groups in public and political institutions, an electoral system that ensures representation.



societies in the new independent states formed as a result of de-colonisation. Later, the models have been developed further and also been criticised. They have become a focal point of both empirical and theoretical debate.<sup>15</sup>

While the models share some common features, they differ in their approach to how inter-ethnic elite cooperation best can be promoted. These differences are fundamental in devising the analytic framework of this thesis and will be presented below.

### **3.2 Consociationalism: Lijphart's approach to inter-ethnic elite cooperation**

#### **3.2.1 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation through institutionalised security**

Lijphart's argument is that inter-ethnic elite cooperation will best be promoted within an institutional structure that provides a basic political security for all major groups in the society (Lijphart 1977). His two main assumptions are i) that elites play a crucial role in conflict management and ii) that ethnicity as a pertinent factor and cleavage in divided societies can neither be overlooked nor manipulated to disappear with the help of institutional mechanisms (Ibid).<sup>16</sup> On the contrary, Lijphart stresses that the institutions have to recognise ethnic division by including the principles of self-determination within a common state and group protection as foundation principles for rules of representation, territorial division of power and rules of decision-making.

The rationale behind devising a system that is founded on group protection mechanisms is that it creates a basic political security. When security for all groups is obtained through guarantee mechanisms, political elites from different ethnic groups will both find it rationally and morally right to cooperate.

---

<sup>15</sup> For a brief overview of the evolution of the models and their main proponents, see Carnegie Project for Complex power-sharing and Self-Determination (2001/2002). For a summary of the main lines of debate between the models, see O'Leary (2005)

<sup>16</sup> The argument behind these assumptions is vested on Lijphart's static approach to ethnic identity. He does not consider ethnic identity to be fluid and changeable, as is argued by what can be defined as the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. The opposing primordial view, which sees ethnicity as a feature obtained by birth, is not either endorsed by Lijphart. Rather, placing these approaches along a continuum, Lijphart is placed closer to the primordial pole than the instrumentalist. He considers efforts aimed to break up group loyalties and replace ethnic identity with other identity factors, as likely to be unsuccessful (Lijphart 1977).

The model which Lijphart argues will create this security and cooperation, contains four institutional devices; i) the grand coalition, ii) a mutual veto, iii) the principle of proportional representation and iv) segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 25-44). Lijphart maintains that each of these four mechanisms will lead towards political security. He describes them as “devices for providing added protection and security”. They are providing a “feeling of security”, “a powerful stimulus” or outright “an important guarantee of political security” (Lijphart 1990: 30-31, 37, 41).

### **3.2.2 Security mechanisms that promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation**

#### *Grand Coalition*

The first mechanism Lijphart suggests is a power-sharing government; a *grand coalition*, with representatives from all significant groups (Lijphart 1977: 25-36). A grand coalition will, according to Lijphart, ensure that all groups will be included in the decision-making process. It thus ensures that policy choices have support from an overwhelming majority rather than a minimum winning coalition. Because of the lack of trust between the different ethnic groups after a civil war, it is better to be in government with your counterpart than to trust him to govern in favour of your interests when you are in opposition (Ibid: 31). A strong opposition, which is the common feature of majoritarian systems, is moreover avoided (Ibid: 26). Thus, Lijphart maintains the presence of a grand coalition is a remedy for creating political security.

#### *Mutual veto*

However, as minorities can still be outvoted in a grand coalition, an additional safeguard mechanism is necessary: all groups have to be able to *veto* decisions that would infringe on their vital interests (Ibid: 36-38). The groups will through the veto be given the opportunity to block political decisions.<sup>17</sup> One way to institutionalise a veto is by “concurrent majority” provisions, according to which a majority in all

---

<sup>17</sup> Lijphart emphasises that one might think the veto will create an ineffective system fraught with dead-locks. He argues that this will be avoided: firstly, the veto shall be mutual, which would reduce the incentives to use it. Secondly, there is always a risk that it will be used against you, therefore the mere presence of it will promote moderate attitudes that make it unnecessary to use. Thirdly, the fear of deadlock will prevent a frequent use (Lijphart 1977: 37).

groups must support a decision in order to make it valid. Lijphart characterises the veto as “the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their vital interests” (Lijphart 1990: 495).

### *Proportional representation*

Proportional representation of all groups in both public and political institutions is a third principle emphasised by Lijphart (Lijphart 1977: 38-41). In order to ensure proportional representation the electoral system is an important mechanism. Lijphart prescribes a proportional electoral system (PR). The PR system ensures, according to Lijphart, that the strength of the most numerical groups is not augmented by the electoral system.<sup>18</sup> “For divided societies, ensuring the election of a broadly representative legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is undoubtedly the optimal way of doing so” (Lijphart 2004: 100). Lijphart states that a PR system is clearly preferable to majoritarian one (Lijphart 2002: 52).

### *Segmental autonomy*

In addition to the mechanisms that regulate representation and inclusion in the political institutions, Lijphart prescribes “*segmental autonomy*”. That means that the ethnical groups are self-governing in issues that are not of common interest (Lijphart 1977:41-44). This form for self-government can be ensured both by territorial or non-territorial division of power. If a group is geographically concentrated, Lijphart prescribes a form of ethnic federalism: a system in which federal units that are largely ethnically homogenous are given extensive autonomous powers. If the groups are geographically inter-mixed, Lijphart prescribes a form of non-territorial federalism, or functional autonomy. On issues such as schools and language, the ethnic groups are given autonomy and are therefore provided with means for protecting their identity.

The ultimate goal with segmental autonomy is to provide political security and self-government for the groups, thus allaying fears and allowing for greater cooperation at the elite level. Lijphart also supports the idea that “good social fences may make good

---

<sup>18</sup> As it would in a majoritarian electoral system.

political neighbours” (Lijphart 1971: 11). The more separated differing groups are in the society, the less likely there is to be conflict.

### **3.2.3 Why will elites cooperate across ethnic lines when political security is guaranteed?**

Against the background of political security created by the mechanisms above, inter-ethnic elite cooperation will be promoted (Lijphart 1977). How and why do the security mechanisms bring this about? - Lijphart does not devote much attention to this question. His theory is mainly founded on inductive observations, and his answer is basically empirical in nature. He can demonstrate that cooperation has been the consequence in a number of countries where the mechanisms described above have been part of the institutional structure (Lijphart 1977).<sup>19</sup> However, his general characteristics of elites and elite motivations serve as legitimating the argument. Lijphart sees political elites as responsible actors in a political game. The elites will actively engage in inter-ethnic elite cooperation both because it is morally right and rational.

Firstly, Lijphart pronounces that the political elites in ethnic divided societies will realise the grave dangers posed by the ethnic differences in the society. Therefore they will choose to transcend mass-antagonism through cooperation (Lijphart 1994: 228; 1977: 52-55). Elites will rationally recognise “the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies” and “deliberate effort to counteract these dangers” (Lijphart 1977: 165). Thus, the inherent potential of violent conflict in ethnic divided societies will, according to Lijphart serve as a motivation for elites to cooperate when a basic political security is assured through the institutional system.

In addition, it is rational for political elites to cooperate based on the logic of “political power incentives”. In order for elites to stay in power it is often rational to reach compromises with their coalition partners (Lijphart 2002: 44). Without compromise they will not play any role and diminish their chances to be re-elected. Lijphart argues

---

<sup>19</sup> The countries he refers to are among others South-Africa, Northern -Ireland, Fiji, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands (Lijphart 1977; 1994).

that elites will behave more moderately and cooperative because this is the only way to gain influence. Ethnic leaders will seek power, and in order to be part of the institutions he prescribes, cooperation is needed

### **3.3 The integrative model: Horowitz' approach to inter-ethnic elite cooperation**

#### **3.3.1 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation through integrative dynamics**

Horowitz' argument is that inter-ethnic elite cooperation best will be promoted within an institutional structure that creates integrative dynamics and seeks to obliterate ethnic divisions (Horowitz 1985). His main assumptions are that elites need incentives in order to cooperate, not only security guarantees, and that ethnic identity is fluid and changeable.<sup>20</sup> He maintains that “boundaries do change, and it is possible to consider the design of measures to utilize shifts in group identity in the interest of conflict reduction” (Ibid: 66). Elites will cooperate not because an institutional structure provides security, but because the structure he prescribes produce ‘integrative dynamics’, that is, dynamics that leads to cooperation and integration (Horowitz 1991a: 154-160; 1985: 597-600).

#### **3.3.2 Integrative dynamics that promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation**

*Ethnicity is given a minimal role*

Horowitz' model is not as specifically designed as Lijphart's. It stands forth more as a set of principles than a list of proposals for the nature of the different institutions. One of his main concerns is that ethnicity as a line of division is not made more salient and important than it has to be. He argues for institutions that promote “policies that encourage alignments based on interest other than ethnicity” (Horowitz 1985: 599). He admits that it seems unlikely in deeply divided societies “that non-ethnic lines of cleavages, such as those based on social class and territory, can be manipulated so as to displace ethnic cleavages”. But, “some measures may provide the impetus for non-ethnic lines of cleavage to compete for attention with ethnic cleavages” (Horowitz

---

<sup>20</sup> Here Horowitz is much closer than Lijphart on the primordialist-instrumentalist approach line. Sisk (1996: 12) use Horowitz as an example to explain the instrumentalist view. See for example Horowitz (1985: 32): “Virtually all ranked systems of ethnic relations are in state of a rapid transition” and “Group boundaries are made of neither stone nor putty. They are malleable within limits” (Ibid: 66).

1985: 599). Based on these principles, Horowitz' approach has been characterised as an approach that "eschews ethnic groups as the building blocks of a common society" (Harris and Reilly 1998: 140).

#### *A preferential electoral system*

One of the concrete mechanisms Horowitz suggests to promote integrative dynamics is the electoral system (Horowitz 1985: 598). He does not put as much emphasis on proportionality as Lijphart does, but advocates that the electoral system shall give the political elites and the ethnic parties incentives to moderate their position and engage in cross-ethnic appeal. He argues for a system that not necessarily secure proportional representation. Rather, the system he proposes rewards elites who are motivated to engage in cross ethnic coalitions and thus to cooperate (Horowitz 1991a: 141).

The system he proposes is a *preferential system*. According to Horowitz the dynamic which fosters moderation and cooperation in such a system is simple; a candidate's election will depend on attracting voters from outside his / her ethnic group, and it therefore forces the candidate to moderate. Horowitz asserts that the incentives built into the system will foster the creation of pre-electoral inter-ethnic coalitions in order to ensure elections. The basic idea is that voters will most likely cast their first preference vote along ethnic lines; however they may be swayed to cast lower preferences across the ethnic divide. Thus, it is here up to the endeavours of the elites to assure that they are represented.

#### *Non-ethnic federalism- heterogeneous federal units*

Federalism or devolution is seen as another institutional device that provides incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation (Horowitz 1985: 601-602; 1991b: 122-124). But contrary to Lijphart, Horowitz does not prescribe federalism as a means to ensure ethnic self-government. Federalism, in Horowitz approach, should preferably be based on ethnically heterogeneous political units, which is argued to foster integrative dynamics. Thereby, the self-determination principle prevalent in the consociational model is denied in the integrative approach. The rationale for Horowitz is that people

living in and elites representing the same federal unit will develop common interests and have an incentive to cooperate with each other in order to successfully compete against the other federal units (Horowitz 1985: 676-680).

### **3.3.3 Horowitz' critique of Lijphart's elite assumptions**

Horowitz developed his integrative approach as a reaction against Lijphart. In particular he objects to the way Lijphart assumes that elite cooperation and moderation will automatically occur as long as guarantee mechanisms are established. Lijphart, according to Horowitz, fails to specify how the institutional mechanisms he prescribes will promote inter-ethnic elite cooperation and moderation.

A central objection of Horowitz against Lijphart's consociational model is directed at Lijphart assumptions about elites' motivations for inter-ethnic cooperation. Horowitz objects to the assumption that elites will see cooperation as morally and rationally right in an institutional system that does not give any strong, direct incentives for cooperation. Horowitz argues that to assume that elites out of 'good will' will cooperate, as he means Lijphart does, is a flawed assumption. The elites will often lack the freedom of action to cooperate due to intra-ethnic party competition (Horowitz 1985: 574-579).

In addition, it is not evident that elites are willing to cooperate. He emphasises the "self-interest nature" of elites and argues that in many instances it can be natural for elites to refrain from cooperation, even in a system that ensures political security. "There are no reason to think automatically", Horowitz writes, "that elites will use their leadership position to reduce rather than pursue conflict" (1991: 141). He has found in his examinations of various divided states that "the very elites who were thought to be leading their peoples away from ethnic affiliations were commonly found to be in the forefront of ethnic conflict" (Horowitz 1985: 97). Due to these elite motivations, elites are not prone to cooperate in a system that does not offer awards and incentives, as the integrative model does.

### 3.4 Brief comparison of the approaches

Lijphart and Horowitz are agreeing that institutional structure is a pertinent aspect in conflict management and group accommodation. This is because the structures and mechanisms affect the way elites cooperate across ethnic lines. They both build their models for conflict management of the interplay between institutions and inter-ethnic elite cooperation.

They disagree, however, over which mechanisms are most effective in bringing this cooperation about. While inter-ethnic cooperation according to Lijphart is promoted by security mechanisms based on group protection, cooperation in Horowitz' approach is seen as a result of institutions and mechanisms that contribute to diminish the role of ethnicity and seek to obliterate ethnic differences. While Lijphart focus on group protection and self-determination of the groups, this is not *a priori* in Horowitz approach. The aim is to obliterate ethnic divide rather than to reflect ethnic division in the institutions. Based on these arguments, they prescribe, as summarised below, different institutional mechanisms for territorial division of power, for rules of representation and for decision-making in ethnic divided societies.

*Table 3.1: Summary of mechanisms in the two power-sharing models*

<b>Principle</b>	<b>Consociational model mechanisms</b>	<b>Integrative model mechanisms</b>
Territorial division of power	Autonomy / federalism Homogenous units	Devolution Heterogeneous units
Principle of representation in political institutions	-PR - Ethnicity based group representation	- Preferential system - 'ethnic blind' representation
Principle of decision-making in political institutions	Vital-interest veto	No requirements mentioned

Thus, the consociational proposition is that an institutional structure containing the consociational mechanisms will most effectively foster inter-ethnic cooperation:



Security mechanisms  Inter-ethnic elite cooperation

The opposing integrative proposition is that an institutional structure containing the integrative mechanisms will most effectively foster inter-ethnic elite cooperation:

Integrative incentive structures  Inter-ethnic elite cooperation

In the following analysis, the mechanisms described in table 3.1 will form the analytical framework for locating the Mostar and Brcko institutional structures within the consociational or integrative paradigm. Based on the findings, the propositions presented above related to institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation will be tested through an examination of the degree of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko.

### **3.5 Challenges to the analytic framework**

As previously mentioned, both the consociational and the integrative models were developed during the Cold War. After the Cold War the nature of international relations and the ways of dealing with civil wars and ethnically divided states have changed profoundly (Kaldor 2001). Both Lijphart and Horowitz argue that their models and the assumptions underlying them are of general validity, and that their models also are fruitful ways to accommodate ethnic differences after contemporary civil wars (Lijphart 2002; Horowitz 2004). In civil wars in the post-cold era international actors have been engaged in conflict management of ethnically divided states in a more direct and substantial way than during the cold war.<sup>21</sup> However, neither Lijphart nor Horowitz have given any considerations as to how international actors affect elite behaviour and elite motivations.

---

<sup>21</sup> For two different comprehensive approaches to and examinations of contemporary international involvement in peace restoration and conflict resolution see Paris (2004) and Jeong (2005)

We here see an empirical changed picture, where one additional actor, the international community, through a range of international organisations, adds to the actor picture. Lijphart's and Horowitz' models for inter-ethnic elite cooperation and conflict management of ethnically divided societies completely ignore this actor. There is a discrepancy between the actor perspective in the models and the actor perspective in reality. This is a serious shortcoming with the models and the conditions on which they are vested and a challenge when testing their propositions in contemporary post-Cols War divided societies.

It is natural to assume that the direct involvement of international actors in conflict resolution after civil war will affect both elites' incentives and motivations for cooperation. While the main focus of the examination of the nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko in chapter five will be on testing the consociational and integrative propositions outlined above, the role of international actors will be integrated and taken into account and possible extended models for perceiving the relation between institutional structures and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in a post-cold war environment will be proposed.

## **4. The power-sharing agreements of Mostar and Brcko**

In this chapter the nature of the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko District statute will be examined. The chapter will provide an exploration of which institutional mechanisms from the theoretical models presented in the previous chapter that can be found in the Statutes. The examination will focus on i) the principles for territorial division of power, ii) the rules for representation with emphasis on electoral system and reserved seats and iii) whether the veto mechanism is incorporated. An examination of these three elements will make it possible to locate the institutional structures of Mostar and Brcko within the integrative or the consociational paradigm, providing an answer to the first of the research questions posed.

### **4.1 Territorial division of power stipulated in the Mostar and Brcko Statutes**

#### **4.1.1 Territorial division of power in Mostar**

The Interim Statute established Mostar as a highly decentralised city. Within the city of Mostar, six city-municipalities were established. The six city-municipalities were given the names Mostar-South, Mostar-South-West, Mostar-West, Mostar-South-East, Mostar-North and Stari Grad (old town) (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 5).<sup>22</sup> The background for this internal division of the municipality was the situation on the ground created by the war. The division represented the demarcation lines created during the war and in practice the three city-municipalities Mostar-South, Mostar - South -West and Mostar-West were controlled by the Croats while Mostar-South-East, Mostar-North and the Old Town were controlled by the Bosniacs (OHR 2003: 51). In the area around the main line of demarcation between the Croats and Bosniacs, a Central Zone was established (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 5; Art. 61-65).

While Mostar prior to the war had been administrated as one single unit, the establishment of the six city-municipalities meant that Mostar now would have two

---

<sup>22</sup> See annex 2 for the size and geographical reach of the city-municipalities.

layers of governance. Each of the city-municipalities was to have their own City-Municipality Councils and City-Municipality Administrations (Ibid: Art. 55-56). In addition, a common City Council and a City Government were established (Ibid: Art. 14).<sup>23</sup>

The City Government was given the responsibility to administer the Central Zone and the rights to exercise sole authority in the spheres of finance and tax policy, urban planning, infrastructure, economic policy and public transport, including the city's railway station and airport. The mayor was empowered to set up departments to manage these five fields of activity (Ibid: Art. 7). All other responsibility was left to the six city-municipalities. This included for instance education and social services (Ibid: Art. 7; Art. 52).

In relation to the theoretical models, the previous chapter presented Lijphart as a proponent of territorial autonomy. In practice, autonomy can be expressed through decentralisation of functions and a vertical division of power between layers of governance. Transferred to local governance, the Mostar model in relation to division of powers is in line with Lijphart's thinking. The Statute established a central institution, the City Government, responsible for common tasks, while the city municipalities were responsible for all other tasks.

In addition, Lijphart favours 'homogenous populated units'. In Mostar, the lines between the six city municipalities in practice created three homogeneously populated Bosniac units and three homogeneously populated Croat units. Thus, the principle of territorial division of power underlying the Mostar statute is in line with the consociational theoretical model.

---

<sup>23</sup> See annex 3 for a chart of the structure.

#### 4.1.2 Territorial division of power in Brcko

For Brcko, the Final Award and the Brcko Statute, established Brcko city and its surrounding areas as “a single administrative unit of local self-government existing under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 1(1)). Due to the contested character of the city and its surroundings, the established District was made autonomous, governed by its own laws and only subordinate to the state level.<sup>24</sup>

The geographical reach of the district was to consist of three pre-war municipalities. This means that a more centralised unit than the pre-war organisation was established. All powers that earlier had been held by the entities and the three pre-war municipalities were to be transferred to a newly established District Assembly and a District Government (Ibid: Art. 1(2)).

In relation to the two theoretical models the principles for a territorial division of power in Brcko is more in line with Horowitz’s than Lijphart’s principles. Brcko was established as one heterogeneous populated unit. The ethnic population structures and the divisions created during the war were not made as foundations for new internal administrative divisions. Horowitz argues, as mentioned, that heterogeneous units have several advantages. In addition, no vertical division of powers between different layers of governance is stipulated for. The only political institutions were the District Government and the District Assembly, responsible for all tasks. Thus, the principle underlying the territorial division of powers in Brcko corresponds more to the integrative model than the consociational one.

*Table 4.1: Territorial division of power, Mostar and Brcko*

<b>City</b>	<b>Mostar</b>	<b>Brcko</b>
Territorial division of power	Consociationalism	Integrative model

<sup>24</sup> As previously accounted for, both the RS and the Federation claimed control over the area, and in order to avoid conflict, the area was established as a District, but still a unit of local governance. For Mostar, the Cantonal level and Federation level are between the state and municipality level. Brcko is directly under the state.

## **4.2 Rules of representation**

Both Lijphart and Horowitz argue for different methods to ensure the representation of all communities. Both put however emphasis on the electoral system as such a mechanism. In addition, Lijphart sees it as important that the composition of the institutions reflect the ethnic composition of the population. According to Bieber, a reserved seats mechanism is the electoral tool providing the most certain guarantee for obtaining such a composition (2005a: 90).

### **4.2.1 Electoral system and reserved seats in Mostar**

The regulation for elections, and thus the determination of the electoral system of Mostar was not accounted for in the Interim Statute. Article 18 stated that these issues would be stated in a special Decree on the conduct of elections (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 18). In accordance with this decree, and subsequent documents, the electoral system for election of the City Council and the Municipality Councils was a proportional system (Bose 2002: 119).

Related to seat reservations, the Statute entailed this guarantee mechanism for ensuring group representation in the City Council, the City Government and the six City-Municipality Councils.

The City Council should consist of 48 councillors. 16 seats were reserved for Bosniacs, 16 for Croats and 16 for ‘others’.<sup>25</sup> (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 16(2)). Later, the number of councillors was reduced to 30, then with 10 seats reserved for Bosniacs, 10 for Croats and 10 for ‘others’. The representation of the groups in the City Government was ensured through the article that stated that the mayor and the deputy mayor should be from different communities (Ibid: Art. 44) and that when appointing the heads of departments, the mayor should take the national composition of the population into consideration (Ibid: Art. 47(4)).

---

<sup>25</sup> ‘others’ refers mainly to Serbs.

At the city municipality level, the six municipalities each were to have City-Municipality Councils with 25 members, which would reflect their territory's pre-war national demography regardless of the size or population of the city-municipalities (Ibid: Art. 56(3)). Article 56 (3) ensured representation of all groups in the Councils through a determination of the number assigned to each group in each city municipality (Figure 4.2).

*Table 4.2: Composition of the six City-Municipalities Councils (Interim Statute, art 56(3)).*

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Bosniacs</b>	<b>Others</b>
Mostar-North	4	11	10
Mostar-Old Town	4	12	9
Mostar-South-East	3	19	3
Mostar-South	12	6	7
Mostar South-West	12	6	7
Mostar West	10	6	9

In relation to the theoretical models, Lijphart argues for a PR system and ethnic representation while Horowitz for a preferential system. The electoral system adopted in Mostar is thus in line with the consociational model.

Moreover, Lijphart is a proponent of a system that takes into consideration the ethnic division of the society, and which make ethnicity as the basis for rules, representation and decision-making. With regards to representation, the reserved seats model in Mostar is, in line with Lijphart, based on ethnicity. Representation of all communities is ensured through quotas both in the City Council and in the six City-Municipality Councils. In addition, group representation is also ensured in the City Government. In Horowitz' account, such a mechanism for guaranteed representation is not mentioned. Thus, the reserved seats principles in the Mostar Statute are in line with the consociational theoretical model.

#### 4.2.2 Electoral system and reserved seats in Brcko

The Brcko Statute, as the Mostar Statute, did not include provisions for an electoral system. However, the Annex to the Final Award states that “in establishing the District electoral system the supervisor may select the any voting mechanism that, in his judgement, will promote full and fair representation of all elements of the District’s multi-ethnic population” (Annex to the Final Award 1999: Para. 9). On 26 May 2000 an interim Election Commission for the District was established by the supervisor in accordance with the Rules and Regulation of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) (OHR Press Releases: 2000b). In October 2003 a Law on Elections was adopted by the District Assembly, and the law provided for a system of proportional representation to elect the 29 councillors of the District Assembly (Supervisor report 2004).

Related to reserved seats, this guarantee mechanism for representation was not stipulated in the Brcko Statute. The article related to the composition of the Assembly only stated that the Assembly was to be composed of twenty-nine Councillors (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 24 (1)). A president and a vice-president of the Assembly were to be elected from among the councillors at the first session of each new electoral term (Ibid: Art. 29). The candidate who would receive a three-fifths majority of the total number of Councillors should become the President (Ibid: Art. 30 (1).)<sup>26</sup>

The District Government should, according to the Brcko Statute, consist of the mayor and the heads of departments. The mayor should be elected by the Assembly (Ibid: Art. 47(1)) and was given the responsibility to appoint the heads of departments. The Statute stated that the appointments should be based on “professional criteria” and that the “heads of government shall reflect the composition of the population” (Ibid: Art. 48(1)).

---

<sup>26</sup> If no candidate receives the required majority in the first election, a second election is held. The candidate who receives a majority of votes of the total number of councillors becomes the president. If no candidate receives a majority in the second election, a third election will be held.



In relation to the theoretical models, the electoral system adopted in Brcko, a PR system, is in line with consociationalism. A striking feature with the Brcko Statute in relation to rules of representation is that no references to ethnicity and stipulation of reserved seats for the communities are included.<sup>27</sup> A ‘grand coalition’ is however, as in Mostar, ensured by stating that the heads of departments shall reflect the composition of the population. In relation to the theoretical models, Horowitz favours a political system where ethnicity is not made the dominant factor and that political life, among which the rules of representation is one of several elements, shall strive to be ‘ethnicity blind’. Thus, the lack of reserved seats based on ethnicity as we find in the Brcko Statute, is here in line with the integrative model.

*Table 4.3: Rules of representation, Mostar and Brcko*

<b>Principle</b>	<b>Mostar</b>	<b>Brcko</b>
Rules of representation		
- Electoral system	Consociationalism	Consociationalism
- Reserved seats	Consociationalism	Integrative model

### **4.3 Decision-making procedures and veto rights**

#### **4.3.1 Decision-making procedures and veto rights in Mostar**

In Mostar, decisions, or resolutions, in the City Council were to be made by the majority of the given votes (Interim Statute 1996: Art. 31(1)). In addition, the Statute contains provisions about a veto mechanism. If issues which are being voted on concerns the fundamental interests of one of the peoples, “the majority of votes in every people is needed apart from the majority of all votes” (Ibid: Art. 31(2)).

In relation to the theoretical models, decisions making procedures in detail are not accounted for, but as previously demonstrated, Lijphart proposes a fundamental interest veto as one of his five security mechanisms. Horowitz does not propose such a

mechanism. The inclusion of the veto mechanism as a principle in the decision-making procedure for the City Council makes thus corresponds to the consociational model.

#### 4.3.2 Decision-making procedures and veto rights in Brcko

In Brcko, the Brcko Statute stipulates that decisions shall be adopted by a simple majority of the Councillors present and voting (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 33), with the exception of decisions concerning certain issues, where a three-fifth majority of the total number of councillors (Ibid: Art. 34(1)).<sup>28</sup> Here, no fundamental interest veto provisions were stipulated, which makes the Brcko procedure more in line with integrative thinking.

*Table 4.4: Veto provisions, Mostar and Brcko*

<b>Principle</b>	<b>Mostar</b>	<b>Brcko</b>
Veto provisions	Consociationalism	The integrative model

#### 4.4 Summary of the findings

This chapter has examined the Interim Statute which entailed the framework for local governance institutions of Mostar and the Brcko Statute which outlined the framework for governance of Brcko. The aim has been to place the systems within the theoretical models described by Lijphart and Horowitz. The principles for territorial division of powers, rules of representation and decision-making and veto provisions have been examined.

The findings suggest that related to *territorial division of power*, the Interim Statute of Mostar is in line with the consociational model while the Brcko Statute is more in line with integrative thinking. When it comes to *rules of representation*, both the electoral systems in Mostar and Brcko are PR systems, thus corresponding to the consociational

<sup>28</sup> These issues were: the adoption of rules and procedures of the Assembly, the Brcko District budget, Brcko District Laws, dismissal of all persons elected by the Assembly, consent of the Mayors appointments of the Districts Police chief and deputy chiefs (Brcko Statute 2000: Art. 34).

model. The principle of reserved seats for each community in the Mostar Statute also is in the line of consociationalism. In Brcko, however, no such provisions are included, thus the underlying principle is here in line with integrative thinking.

The *rules of decision-making and veto provisions* that are stipulated in the Statutes show that a fundamental interest veto is included in the Mostar Statute, in line with consociationalism, whereas in Brcko no veto rights to the communities is included, thus also here is place Brcko in line with the integrative model. The findings are summarised below in table 4.5.

*Table 4.5: Summary of the institutional structures, Mostar and Brcko*

<b>Institutional principle / mechanism</b>	<b>Mostar Statute</b>	<b>Brcko Statute</b>
Territorial division of power	C	I
Rules of representation		
- Electoral system	C	C
- Ethnicity based	C	I
Veto mechanism	C	I

Based on the presence or lack of such of the mechanisms the theoretical models entails, it is evident that the Mostar Statute to a large extent corresponds to the consociational model, whereas the Brcko Statute is closer to an integrative model. However, it would be wrong to say that the Brcko model is completely integrative due to the electoral system, where elements from the consociational model is evident, but all other principles are non the less in integrative lines as the focus on diminishing the role of ethnicity is evident and formal group protection is evident.

As discussed in the preceding chapter that presented Lijphart and Horowitz' models, we saw that they both argue that their model is most prone to foster elite cooperation. The next chapter will examine the pattern and nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko and test these divergent expectations.

## **5. Inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko**

The second research question posed in this thesis involves a comparison and discussion of the institutional structures of respectively Mostar and Brcko. Which of the structures did most effectively contribute to the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation? - The ambition in the following is to test the propositions inherent in the consociational and integrative models outlined in the theoretical chapter. The consociational proposition is that an institutional structure like the one in Mostar will most effectively promote inter-elite cooperation. The opposing integrative proposition is that an integrative institutional structure, like the one in Brcko, will prove to be more effective.

Three aspects indicating the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation will be examined; i) the character of the process to establish the institutions devised by the Statutes in the two cities ii) The elites' responses to electoral results and electoral dynamics in the municipality elections four years after the enactment of the two Statutes and iii) the functionality of the institutions in the two cities. Developments in Mostar and Brcko will be compared according to these three aspects, and the supposition is that the results will indicate the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two cities.

### **5. 1 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation and the establishment of the institutions**

The character of the process of establishing the political institutions in Mostar and Brcko provides a good indicator of the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two cities immediately after the enactment of the Statutes. If elites were not willing to cooperate and compromise, the process would take long and the establishment impeded by non-cooperative actions.

The initial consociational claim is that a consociational institutional structure, like the one in Mostar will be most effective in the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. The opposing integrative claim is that an integrative structure, like the one in Brcko will be most effective in this respect. It follows from these claims that according to

consociational expectations, the process to establish the Mostar institutions will be easier and faster than the process to establish the Brcko institutions. This expectation is based on the argument that the security mechanisms provided by the consociational model will make it easier for the elites to accept the institutions.

According to integrative expectations, the process of establishing the Brcko institutions will be easier because institutions here are not based on ethnicity, but contain other mechanisms than security mechanisms which will promote cooperative dynamics.

Which of these propositions does the character of the establishment process in Mostar after the signing of the agreement in 1996 and the character of establishment process in Brcko after the signing in March 2000 confirm?

### **5.1.1 Establishment of the City Council, the City Government and the City-Municipality Councils in Mostar**

#### *Background*

The establishment of the institutions in Mostar was based on the June 1996 municipal elections.<sup>29</sup> The two nationalist parties, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) were the clear winners in the elections. SDA, together with three small coalition parties, won 49 per cent of the votes and the HDZ got 46 per cent (28,505 and 26,680 respectively) (OSCE BiH 1996). A list consisting of five opposition non-nationalist and multi-ethnic parties polled only 1,927 votes, around 3,5 per cent of the total (Ibid).<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Elections for Mostar was agreed on at the Dayton negotiations (Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 10 November 1995, section II, I:2). The Interim Statute included a Decree on the Conduction of the Elections defining the technical details for organizing the elections for the City and City municipalities (Reichel 2000: 30). The EU was responsible for the organization of the election, and the election took place on 30 June 1996.

<sup>30</sup> The parties in the Coalition were the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), the Liberals and the Croatian Peasant's Party (HSS) (Bose 2002: 117).

The two winners, the SDA-led Coalition, headed by the war-time mayor of East-Mostar, the Bosniac Safet Ourucevic and the HDZ, led by the Croat Ivan Prackalo, had run electoral campaigns where their differences with regard to their future visions of Mostar were evident. While the SDA-led coalition called for the implementation of the Interim Statute and the reunification of Mostar, the HDZ had run a campaign in which the goals were to divide the city along the ethnic lines cemented during the war and to ensure the status of West-Mostar as the Croat capital of Bosnia(ICG 2000: 12).<sup>31</sup>

Taking these divergent views into consideration, it is not difficult to understand that the process to establish the institutions became difficult and long. The non-nationalist opposition was weak, and the formation process was mainly in the hands of the SDA-led Coalition and the HDZ. Despite the signature of HDZ on the Rome Agreement, and thereby the party's acceptance of the institutional structure of the city determined in the Interim Statute, it is evident that HDZ and the local HDZ party elites in reality were not willing to cooperate with the SDA-led coalition to establish the common institutions.

*HDZ resistance and the lack of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the formation process*

HDZ's first move to impede the formation of the institutions was to refuse to recognise the election results (Ibid: 13). Due to alleged irregularities at a polling station in Germany the HDZ declared the election results as not valid. The issue was brought to the EU administration which finally found no irregularities and declared the results as valid on 6 July 1996 (Decision of the EU Ombudsman, 6 July 1996). This had postponed the process and created uncertainties for one month, and continued to do so when then the HDZ did not accept the Ombudsman's decision and brought the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, was not yet formed, and the HDZ knew that it would take a long time before the Court would be able to make a decision.

Interpreted by the ICG as an additional attempt to prevent the establishment of the institutions, was the creation of the 'Union of Croat Municipalities' (hereafter the

---

Union) in June 1996 where HDZ was the main actor behind the initiative. The Union was meant to jointly administer West-Mostar without Bosniac participation. According to ICG, the creation was “clearly an attempt to institutionalize the ethnic division of the city administratively” and prevent Bosniac influence and cooperation (2000a: 13).

Mile Puljic, President of the HDZ Mostar City Board, gave this statement in July 1997: “We will make an association of these three Croat municipalities into one. The municipal Council will be for the community of Croat municipalities, those new leaders will sit together. We will see a chance in the municipalities, to take the election in the municipalities, strengthen them and unite them and in the end to administer a Croat territory according to the measures of the Croat man” (Ibid: 16).<sup>32</sup> The OHR, OSCE and other major international actors declared the Union “unlawful and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Dayton Agreement” (Ibid).

Another action, with the same intention, namely to prolong the establishment process was the HDZ’ objection to the inclusion of a ‘vital-interest’ clause into the Statutes of the six City-Municipalities. This, according to ICG, contributed to the postponement of the formation of the City Municipality Councils (Ibid: 13).

In addition, HDZ prolonged the formation process by objecting to SDA dominance in the City Council,<sup>33</sup> and by refusing to accept the ethnic distribution of seats in the six Municipality Councils agreed on in the Interim Statute. The pre-assignment of seats was based on the 1991 census and thus pre-war settlement patterns. HDZ argued for and wanted the majority of seats in the municipalities were Croats now were in majority.

---

<sup>32</sup> The statement was printed in the newspaper *Slobodna Dalmacija* 2 July, 1996 and quoted by the ICG.

<sup>33</sup> The Council consisted of 37 seats. SDA was able to gain 21 seats, the 16 reserved for Bosniacs and the five seats reserved for ‘others’ because the Serbs and other non-Bosniacs on the SDA list gained more votes than those on the HDZ list.

### *International involvement*

The HDZ strategy to prevent the establishment of the institutions seemed to work, but the EU and USA put pressure on the Tudjman regime in Zagreb to force HDZ-Bosnia to accept the election results and cooperate to form the institutions (ICG 2000a: 13; Bose 2002: 117). A failure to do so would harm Croatia's relations with the EU (ICG 2000a: 13). Thus, due to Croatian pressure, the HDZ agreed to token participation in the City Council, on the condition that the first mayor would be a Croat. HDZ agreed that the City Council would convene in August and appoint the mayor and the deputy mayor and to establish the City Government according to the Interim Statute (Joint Action-agreement 1996). At the first session of the City Council in August 1996, the Croat Ivan Prskalo became the mayor and Bosniac Safet Orucevic became deputy mayor. A City Government was subsequently formed. Pressure, and not institutional logic finally led to the formation of the City Council and the City Government.

The formation of the six City-Municipality Councils, however, did not take place before June 1997. The SDA threatened to boycott the upcoming September elections if the Councils were not formed. Again, pressure dynamics spurred the formation, not actions of cooperation.

### *Mostar – a long and difficult process*

As this examination shows, the process to establish the power-sharing institutions in Mostar took long. The last institutions were not established until June 1997, one year after the election. The process was difficult due to recurrent HDZ refusal of cooperation and their determination to exclude Bosniac political elites.

Even if mechanisms that secured the representation and co-decision of the ethnic groups were in place, there were few signs of inter-ethnic cooperation and willingness in the political elites to get the institutions to function. Especially the Croat elite was negative to the new institutions. The institutional set up seemed to have had a marginal influence on the elite's behaviour and patterns of cooperation.



### **5.1.2 Establishment of the District Assembly and the District Government in Brcko**

#### *Background*

In Brcko, the establishment of the District Assembly and the District Government after the signing of the Brcko Statute was in several respects different from that in Mostar. Most importantly, the International Community did not choose to establish the institutions through elections. Instead the supervisor was given the task to appoint the representatives, the heads of departments, the mayor and the deputy mayor.

Thus, it is natural that the establishment and the formation of the governance institutions in Brcko did not develop the same dynamics and issues of conflict as in Mostar institutions, which were based on election results close after the war. The reactions to the appointments, which will be accounted for below, nonetheless give insight into the attitudes and behaviour of the elites.

During March 2000 the Brcko Supervisor Robert Farrand appointed the mayor and a deputy-mayor, the District Government and the District Assembly. The appointments took place in cooperation with the OSCE, the International Peace Implementation Council and other international organisations (ICG 2003a: 13). The basis for the appointments was primarily lists of candidates submitted by the political parties (OHR Press Release 2000a). As noted earlier, no pre set-ethnic quota system or reserved seats guided the appointments. The Supervisor “sought to appoint persons in an ethnically, politically and gender-balanced way” (ICG 2003a: 13).

The District Government, appointed by Farrand 8 March 2000, consisted of nine department heads, a mayor and a deputy-mayor. The Serb Sinisa Kistic, who previously had been the mayor of the RS part of the municipality, became mayor. One of the department heads (a Croat) was also assigned to be deputy-mayor. Among the 10 department heads, 4 were Bosniacs, 4 were Serbs and 2 were Croats (Supervisory Order 2000b)

On 21 March the 29 members of the District Assembly were appointed (Supervisory Order 2000c). Among the members, 13 were Serbs, 9 were Bosniacs and 7 were Croats. Compared to the 1997 election results and power balance between Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats, the Serbs (with 13 seats) were deprived of the majority they had enjoyed in the Assembly elected in 1997 in the former RS municipality. The Bosniacs (nine seats) were under-represented when compared to their pre-war share of the population, but they got the post of assembly president. Croats got seven seats, under-represented according to their 1991 share of the population (25,4 per cent) but over-represented in terms of their share of the population in 2000 (ICG 2003a: 13).

### *Reluctant cooperation*

How did the parties react to the ethnic distribution of seats? According to Robert Farrand, the supervisor at the time, all parties reacted, but no incidences of boycott or obstruction occurred (Farrand 2006). The Social Democrat Party (SDP) came to see Farrand in order to gain one more seat in the Assembly, but Farrand did not meet this demand (ibid).<sup>34</sup> All the Bosnian Serb parties, this surprised Farrand, accepted the numbers without formal protests, and the Bosnian Croat parties were pleased, since their number of seats was doubled compared to the 1997 electoral result (Ibid).

These reactions suggest that the political elites accepted the power-sharing model and did not impede the establishment of the institutions. The ethnic distribution of seats was not pre-set, and accordingly the composition of the Assembly determined by Farrand could have been an issue for discussions and protests that would have prolonged the establishment process.

However, the relationship between the different national political elites in Brcko should not be seen as easy and harmonious. Farrand characterised the relationship between the main parties in March 2000 as one where they “were hardly getting along”, and that conflicts existed (ibid). Nevertheless, the mere acceptance of the

---

<sup>34</sup> The SDP is characterized as a multiethnic political party, but according to Farrand, the local branch was mainly consisting of Bosniacs.

appointments and the distribution of seats put forward by Farrand, point in the direction that the elites were willing to cooperate, and that the relief to “be in the game” was stronger than the negative attitudes (ibid). The inaugural session for the District Assembly was held on 31 March 2000 (ICG 2003a: 13).

#### *Brcko – an easy process*

As this examination has shown, the process to establish the power-sharing institutions in Brcko went quickly and without major obstructions or impeding actions from the elites. The institutions were established immediately after the enactment of the statute and the appointments.

However, the International Community, and most importantly the Brcko supervisor, were the main actors in the process. The ethnic distribution of seats was balanced and Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs were represented in the institutions. International actors replaced the security mechanism the institutional structure was lacking with respect to ensured representation. That the process was entirely international driven gave the elites a minimal room for potential obstruction.

Notwithstanding, elite behaviour after the appointments shows that elites from all the three ethnic groups were willing to accept to the supervisor’s appointments, and for that reason the institutions were formed without delay.

#### **5.1.3 Theory and practice: inter-ethnic elite cooperation and the establishment of power-sharing institutions**

The initial proposition was that if a consociational structure is more effective in the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation than an integrative structure, the establishment process in Mostar would be easier than the one in Brcko. If on the contrary an integrative structure is more effective in inter-ethnic elite cooperation promotion, the process in Brcko would be easier. The character of the establishment process can be seen as an indicator on the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation.

The examination of two establishment processes has shown that the process in Brcko was quick and relatively easy, while the one in Mostar was long and fraught with conflicts and non-cooperative behaviour. This, seemingly, confirms the expectations of the integrative camp, while the consociationalists ought to be disappointed. And in fact it seems as if the security mechanisms in the Mostar structure did little to contribute to promote the dynamics expected by Lijphart. While Lijphart prophesizes that elites will actively engage in cooperation with ethnic adversaries, both based on moral and rational motivations, elites in Mostar did neither seem interested in nor willing to cooperate and share power. The HDZ elites were interested in preventing power-sharing. This was expressed through a number of actions that impeded the formation of the institutions. The behaviour of the Croat elites in Mostar and their lack of motivation to cooperate justify Horowitz criticism of Lijphart's assumptions about elite motivations for cooperation.

Elites in Brcko both accepted the institutional structures and cooperated, although reluctantly. However, no major protests were promoted. Even if the system lacked the group protection mechanisms Lijphart prescribes, the elites were willing to participate and engage in the power-sharing institutions.

The findings have also shown that international actors played an important role in the process to establish the institutions both in Mostar and Brcko. In Mostar, international actors put hard pressure on the elites to form the institutions, while in Brcko the supervisor had a more direct role due to his role in appointing the Assembly and the Government.

This is relevant for several reasons. Firstly, the behaviour of the elites in Brcko and their acceptance despite the lack of security mechanisms can be explained by the fact that the supervisor and the international administration functioned as a security mechanism. The supervisor made sure that all groups were represented. Instead of

institutional security, the Brcko elites was secured both representation and co-decision through international mechanisms.

Secondly, both in Mostar and Brcko it was international actor dynamics, not institutional dynamics, as expected in the consociational and integrative approaches, that was the main driving force and determinant in the establishment process.

These two insights provide good grounds for arguing that the international actor dimension and the incentives, constraints and motivations created by this actor are important factors in the analysis of the relation between institutional structure and promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation after contemporary civil wars.

## **5.2 Electoral dynamics and elite responses to representation rules**

The response of the elites to electoral dynamics and representation rules in the Mostar 2000 municipality and the Brcko 2004 municipality is a good indicator on the nature of and the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation four years after the establishment of the institutions. If the elites did not want to cooperate, the responses would be non-cooperative responses aimed at excluding elites from other nationalities.

When the electoral dynamics after the Mostar 2000 elections and the Brcko 2004 election is analysed, it should be possible to get an interesting perspective on the success – or lack of success - of our two models.

### **5.2.1 The Mostar 2000 municipality election**

*Background: Election results- victory for nationalist parties*

In the 2000 municipality election in Mostar the two nationalist parties, HDZ and SDA were the two clear winners and managed to get 80 per cent of the votes. HDZ got 43 per cent and SDA 37 per cent. SDP increased its share since the 1997 elections and obtained 13 per cent of the votes (OSCE BiH 2000). The other non-nationalist parties gained the 7 per cent marginal remaining share (Ibid).

*Elite responses to the election results: Grand coalition formation*

Based on these electoral results, the nationalist parties were the dominant actors in the post-electoral coalition formation process. The elites from both HDZ and SDA responded to the electoral results cooperatively, without objections. The post-electoral implementation went quickly and a post-electoral coalition between SDA and HDZ was formed. The Bosniac Safet Orucevic (SDA) was elected mayor and the Croat Neven Tomic (HDZ) was elected deputy mayor 23 June 2000 (OHR Media Round Up 2000a). SDA and HDZ also formed the City Government together, and the mayor appointed the heads of departments from all nationalities (ibid). Both a grand ruling coalition; the City Government, and the City Council were thus formed through cooperation.

*Elite responses to mechanisms for representation*

The rules of representation in Mostar were, as previously outlined, based on a pre-definition of quotas that should ensure the representation of all the three largest ethnic groups in the political institutions. After the 2000 municipal elections the allocation of seats in accordance with the quotas defined in the Statute, started. The process, however, showed that the system in addition to ensuring representation, also contributed to increase the influence of the nationalist parties. This effect of the quota system was possible because the nationalist parties, according to Bose, had figured out the logic behind the system (Bose 2002: 122). Their response to the mechanism had prior to the election been a strategic selection of candidates (Ibid). This act can be seen as rational, but had the consequence that the parties less willing to cooperate and rule inclusively filled the quotas.

In the Mostar South-West municipality, where the Croats were entitled to 12 out of 25 seats, the HDZ retained majority control by winning 15 seats. That several Serbs included on the HDZ list were elected contributed to make this possible. In Mostar-West, Croats were supposed to fill only 10 seats, but the HDZ won 15 seats here as well, again including a number of Serb candidates. In Mostar-South, where Croats were entitled to a maximum of 12 seats, the HDZ won 19 of the 25 seats, including at

least three Bosniacs in addition to several Serbs. Similarly, in each of the three Bosniac dominated city-municipalities, the SDA list gained the majority of seats.<sup>35</sup>

It can be argued that what the quota system contributed to in Mostar was the promotion of multi-ethnic party lists. The nationalist parties responded to the mechanism by including their ethnic adversaries. Notwithstanding, neither HDZ nor SDA in the Mostar region can be seen, according to Bose, to represent the interests of other than the Croats and Bosniacs, respectively (Ibid).

In addition, the pre-defined quotas did contribute to give the most marginal of the three groups, the Serbs, a certain representation in the City Council that would otherwise not been the case (Bose 2002: 123). The SDA's city councillors included prominent local Serbs, Milan Jovicic and Ratko Pejjanovic, and Jovicic subsequently became the deputy speaker of the City Council (Bose, 2002: 123).

#### *Mostar 2000: post-electoral nationalist cooperation and*

Electoral dynamics and elite responses to rules of representation in relation to the Mostar 2000 election has shown that elites responded to the electoral results by engaging in the establishment of a grand coalition. In the City Council all three groups, Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats, were represented, and that the Serb representatives were ensured representation through the reserved seats quota system. Thus, overall, the elites responded inclusively and with willingness to cooperate.

### **5.2.2 The Brcko 2004 municipal elections**

#### *Background: Election results - a strong moderate block*

In the municipality election in Brcko, nationalist parties together gained 44 per cent of the votes. SDA obtained 10 per cent, HDZ 7 per cent and the Serb nationalist party, the Serb Democratic party (SDS) won 17 per cent. Among the more moderate parties, SDP won 19 percent of the votes, the Union of Independent Socialists (SNSD)

---

<sup>35</sup> The source of these figures is the detailed results of the April 2000 Bosnian local elections posted on the OSCE-BiH website, [www.oscebih.org](http://www.oscebih.org)

obtained 5 per cent and a coalition consisting of the Croat Peasants Party (HSS) and the New Croat Initiative (NHI) won 4 per cent (The Bosnian Electoral Commission 2004). Hence, the non-nationalist block in Brcko was much stronger than in the Mostar 2000 elections.

*Elite responses to election results and mechanisms for representation*

The post-electoral negotiations brought together a coalition of moderate Serb, Bosniac and Croat parties after the nationalists failed to gain support in the District Assembly (Bieber 2005: 429). The coalition consisted of seven parties with SDP, SNSD and HSS-NHI as the leading parties. The SDP's candidate to become mayor, Mirsad Djapo, was elected by the Assembly in December 2004 (OHR Media Round Up 2004).

Djapo appointed the District Government on 31 December 2004. The 'grand coalition' consisted of eleven department heads coming from the seven majority parties in the Assembly (OHR Media Round Up 2005c). Of the 11 appointees, there were five Serb, three Bosniac and three Croat members (Ibid). The appointments made by the mayor met criticism, but the critics were related to party belongings, not directly to the national composition of the government. The Mayor Djapo stated that: "I am satisfied that the objections were made in relation to only three departments and not more. This means I have reached an optimum. It is important no person has made any remarks with regard to national composition of the government or with regard to its quality" (OHR Media Round up 2005a). On 18 January 2005 the delegates of the Brcko District Assembly endorsed the proposal of the government's composition put forward by Djapo (OHR media Round up 2000b).

*Brcko 2004: inclusive behaviour and moderate post-electoral coalition formation*

A stringing feature with the elites' responses to the election results in Brcko was their willingness to cooperate and to engage in the formation of a broad coalition. All parties responded inclusively and objections related to national composition were not promoted.



### **5.2.3 Theory and practice: inter-ethnic elite cooperation and electoral dynamics**

The initial proposition was that if a consociational structure is more effective in the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation than an integrative structure, the elites in Mostar would respond to electoral dynamics and rules of representation with more inclusive behaviour than the elites in Brcko.

The examination of the Mostar 2000 and the Brcko 2004 municipal elections has shown that the elites in both cities responded inclusively, and that it is difficult to identify any differences in the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. Neither in Brcko nor in Mostar did elites express any objections or exclusivist responses.

These inclusive responses in both cities can be seen as a confirmation of both Lijphart's and Horowitz' expectations related to institutional structure and promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. Based on findings from Mostar and Brcko, cooperation in the implementation of electoral results some time after the initial establishment of the structures is not more difficult within an institutional consociational framework than in an integrative one.

Nevertheless, the findings have shown some interesting results related to Horowitz' criticism of the PR system and Lijphart's endorsement of ethnicity-based ensured representation which in practice can involve reserved seats and ethnic quota systems.

As previously outlined, Horowitz favours a preferential electoral system. He maintains that the PR system has negative consequences for party system developments and for the nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation. His argument is that the PR system makes it difficult for moderate parties to attract voters and to be able to gain influence. The findings from Mostar and Brcko in this respect point in different directions. While the Mostar electoral results, where nationalist parties gained 80 per cent of the votes and were able to dominate all institutions, the Brcko results show that non-nationalist moderate parties attracted more votes than the nationalist ones, and were able to gain power through the formation of a wide coalition. Brcko had as previously shown

adopted a structure in integrative model, but with the PR system. The party developments in Brcko shows that moderate parties can develop and succeed in a PR system.

Related to a reserved seats system and Lijphart's endorsement of mechanisms that ensure the representation of all groups, the findings have shown that such a mechanism has a side effect not emphasised by Lijphart. The system is easy to manipulate and in Mostar the reserved seats contributed to increase the influence of the nationalist parties, the one less likely to be willing to cooperate. In Mostar, the system secured the groups representation, but in addition was a tool for the nationalist parties to secure their position. In Brcko, where such a system is not included, none of the groups were nonetheless excluded.

### **5.3 Functionality of the institutions**

The functionality and ability to make and implement decisions of the political institutions in Mostar and Brcko is a good indicator on the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two cities. A feature of power-sharing institutions is that their functionality is dependent on the actual cooperation of elites. Non-cooperation results in ineffective institutions.

Is the consociationalist or integrative position confirmed when examining the functionality of the consociational institutions in Mostar from 1997 to 2004 and the integrative institutions in Brcko from 2000 to 2004?

#### **5.3.1 Elite cooperation and functionality of the Mostar institutions 1997-2004**

##### *1997-1999: hampered functionality*

After the long process of establishing the institutions in Mostar, the situation continued to be difficult. It was hard to get the institutions to function. In October 1997 the High Representative regarded the situation and developments in Mostar with concern and

wrote that “the situation in Mostar continues to be volatile with the Croat partners not yet having honoured its obligation to dissolve the Union of the three West Mostar municipalities” (HR 1997). The Croat partners he refers to is the HDZ Mostar elite. The Union of West Mostar municipalities was a parallel illegal institutional structure established by the HDZ as an attempt to exclude Bosniac councillors from decision-making (ICG 2000a).

With the continued existence of the Union of Croat Municipalities the six common City-Municipality Councils and the common city institutions established subsequent to the Interim Statute, were effectively put out of function. The Union functioned as the main institution of interest and the only institution that mattered for most of the Croat elites.

In 1999 the HR remarked that “the situation in Mostar has not yet seen any significant improvement due to obstruction of both sides” (HR 1999a) and later the same year it is noted that “Mostar remains in serious deadlock” (HR 1999b). In commenting on the work of the City Government, Bose (2002: 117) characterises the City Government in this period as “weak and ineffectual”. The government, he argues, was paralysed by “Croat-Muslim hostility” (Ibid).

### *2000: Year of progress*

During 2000, the climate for cooperation seemed to improve and the institutions started to hold sessions permanently. The HR wrote:

“Since my last report, the situation in the City of Mostar and the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton has improved considerably. This progress has been achieved mainly due to the new positive approach by certain politicians to work together. This movement, led by Deputy Mayor Neven Tomic (Croat) with the assistance of Mayor Orucevic (Bosniac), and by some Cantonal officials, has resolved issues in this short period of time which have been plaguing the City of Mostar for the past three years” (HR 2000).

In July 2000 the PIC Steering Board also noted these attempts by “responsible politicians in Mostar to find pragmatic forms of cooperation across ethnic divide” (PIC 2000). Finn Lynghjem, the Mostar OHR Deputy at the time, confirmed these positive developments (Lynghjem 2006). He particularly emphasised that the City Government which had been virtually non-existent prior to 2000, started to meet frequently and that the mayors of the six city municipalities and the mayor and deputy mayor all signed the Mostar Document where they agreed to improve the functionality of the institutions (Ibid). In addition, Lynghjem pointed at the importance of a functioning cooperation between the Mayor Tomic and the Deputy Mayor Orucevic (Ibid).

However, a problem among the elites in Mostar was their willingness to sign documents, but their reluctance to implement and stick to the agreements in practice (Lynghjem 2006). The positive trends did not seem to result in concrete implementations of efficient policy-making.

#### *2001-2004: hampered functionality*

This is confirmed when the High Representative in 2003 stated that “the continuing division of Mostar remained a serious problem during the reporting period. Eight years after the war, the City of Mostar is a collection of municipalities without coordination and without the capacity to generate the development of the City” (HR 2003).

Also the cooperation between the major and the deputy-major, and the functionality of the institutions seemed to have stopped. The City’s institutions had virtually by 2003 ceased to operate. In October 2003 the Daily *Dnevni List* states that the City Government had not met in formal sessions for eight month (OHR Media Round Up 2003). That the level of contact between the different mayors from the Bosnian and Croat city municipalities was low is confirmed by a statement by one of the mayors. He stated that he “meets with the opposite numbers from the other side only for formal

meetings with international officials designed for photographing, smiling and getting donations, after which each participant returns to his own yard” (ICG 2003b: 3).<sup>36</sup>

In this situation, a Commission for reforming the City of Mostar was established. The final 2003 report provide legitimisations for a reform. It claims that “parallel systems exists in order to serve the interest of specific constitute people rather than existing to perform a more general civic duty (Commission Report 2003: 12). In the report a number of indications related to functionality that underline the low level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation are referred to (Ibid).

- The six city municipalities functioned in reality as two separate blocks.
- The City Council has not realised any of its functions
- The Mayor and the Deputy Mayor were working in parallel to each other
- The City has remained divided with rampant parallelism and complete lack of cooperation between the mayor and deputy mayor.

Judged from this development of institutional functionality the level of cooperation between the elites representing different nationalities in Mostar was low.

### **5.3.2 Elite cooperation and functionality of the Brcko institutions 2000-2005**

#### *2000-2004: efficiency and progress under international administration*

From the very beginning of the establishment of the Brcko institutions the HR noted how well the institutions established after the enactment of the Brcko District Statute were functioning. “The multi-ethnic Government and the Assembly are in place and fully operational”, the HR noted in October 2000 (HR 2000). In the period from its establishment and the inaugural session on 31 March 2000 to end of November 2000, the District Assembly had succeeded in agreeing on and adopted 10 district laws (Ibid).

The progress continued and in 2001. One year after the establishment of the District and its institutions the HR continued to be satisfied with the developments in Brcko

---

<sup>36</sup> ICG interview with Vjekoslav Kordic, Mayor of municipality south, 5 September 2003.

(HR 2001). In the end of 2001, the complete reintegration of the three administrative structures of the three pre-war municipalities into one was seen as completed (HR 2002).

In 2002, the High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch expressed his satisfaction with the progress made in Brcko, and emphasised the successful establishment of a multi-ethnic integrated school system, judiciary reform and reconstruction and return (OHR Press Release 2002). These had all been difficult issues that had required cooperation between the politicians from all the three ethnic groups.

In 2003 the District Assembly passed 39 laws and amendments. According to the Supervisor, the “Assembly continued to play a constructive role” in the implementation of the requirements agreed on in the Final Award (Supervisor Report, 2004: IIIa).

*2004-2005: Efficiency and progress with elected politicians*

In the first half of 2005 it is remarked that the Brcko District’s multiethnic institutions functioned effectively and permanently. The HR emphasised the elected Assembly’s and the Government’s reputation, which he finds well deserved, as being “one of the most effective and multi-national administrations in BiH”. The items set to be implemented in the 1999 Final Award had with exception of a few points been implemented (HR 2005).

Judged from the over-all progress on the developments in Brcko and the fulfilment of agreed agreements, the level of cooperation between the elites in Brcko can be seen as high.

### **5.3.3 Theory and practice – elite cooperation and functionality of power-sharing institutions**

The initial proposition was that if a consociational structure is more effective in the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation than the integrative structure, the functionality of the Mostar institutions would be better than the Brcko institutions. If, on the contrary, an integrative structure is more effective, the Brcko institutions would function more effectively.

The overview of the functionality of the Mostar and Brcko institutions has shown that while the Brcko institutions were recurrently praised for their functionality and ability to devise laws and implement decisions, concerns and negative remarks characterises the Mostar record. This gives support to the integrative claim, that an integrative institutional structure, like the one in Brcko, is more effective in the promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation.

Again Lijphart's elite assumptions regarding elites' wiliness to cooperate within a system that provides political security, as in Mostar, seem to be disconfirmed. Moreover, the record of the functionality of the common institutions in Mostar shows that the decentralised structure of the city, with two layers of governance and administration, the common City Council and the common City Government as one layer and the six City-municipality Councils and administrations as an additional layer, impeded the development of effective institutions and thus the functionality.

The city municipality institutions became the main locus of powers and the institutions the elites perceived as the one of importance. The common institutions became empty shells that only in short periods met frequently and were thus unable to perform its tasks and duties. This development was not the intention in 1996 when the institutional structure of Mostar was determined. The Mostar Statute even entails an article that states that "the city-municipalities can transfer tasks in their competences to the City

of Mostar by a resolution of the city-municipality council” (Mostar Statute 1996: Art. 53(1)). Such transfers did not happen. And the common institutions did not manage to decide on or implement the tasks assigned to them by the Statute (ICG 2002: 29-56).

It seems that the mechanism of autonomy proposed by Lijphart as a security mechanism for promotion of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in practice contributed to maintain a politically and administratively divided city.

In Brcko, on the contrary, the unification of the three pre-war municipalities was successfully implemented and the only layer of institutions, the District Government and the District Assembly without veto provisions, functioned according to the Statute.

Notwithstanding, the international actor dimension again have to be emphasised. While the Brcko institutions until 2004 operated in close cooperation with and under close supervision of the international administration, international actors through in the same direct manner were not involved in Mostar political life. This can contribute to explain differences in the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in the two cities, and thus again points in the direction that this actor dimension needs to be included when theoretically treating the relation between institutional structure and inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Post-Cold war divided societies.



## **6. Summary and conclusions**

In this thesis the aim has been, within a defined theoretical framework, to examine the relations between institutional structures and inter-ethnic elite cooperation after civil war. The theoretical point of departure was a discussion and comparison of the consociational and the integrative models. Both these models claim that the principles and institutional devices they prescribe, are the ones most likely to contribute to inter-ethnic elite cooperation in ethnic divided societies.

In order to test these viewpoints, the thesis has presented a comparative study of Brcko and Mostar. The examination has been undertaken through a two-step analysis. The first question posed was which elements of the consociational and integrative models could be identified in the Mostar Interim Statute and the Brcko District Statute. The second issue was to uncover which of the structures described in Mostar and Brcko that most effectively contributed to create a fertile ground for inter-ethnic elite cooperation. The following will first provide a summary of the findings and some concluding remarks.

### **6.1 The mechanisms and principles in the Mostar and Brcko Statutes – A consociational or integrative structure?**

The findings has shown that while the Statute of Mostar stipulated an institutional system and principles in line with the consociational model, the Brcko statute defined the institutions and principles valid for Brcko more in line with the integrative model. The elements analysed were the principles for division of power, the principles and mechanisms for rules of representation and whether veto provisions were included.

Related to the first aspect, territorial division of power, the Mostar Statute devised the city in small homogenous units with wide powers of autonomy, thus in line with consociationalism, while the Brcko statutes integrated three pre-war municipalities

into one heterogeneous unit and only one institutional layer, in line with integrative thinking.

Related to the second aspect, rules and principles for representation, the Mostar Statute stipulated PR and reserved seats according to ethnicity, as in consociationalism, while the Brcko Statute did not give references to ethnicity as a basis for the institutional composition of seats, but adopted a PR system. For Brcko, thus, the picture is here mixed.

Related to the third aspect, veto as a security mechanism was included in the Mostar Statute, as in the consociational model, while there was no such mechanism introduced in Brcko. The findings are summarised in table 6.1 below.

*Table 6.1: Summary of the institutional structures, Mostar and Brcko*

<b>Institutional principle / mechanism</b>	<b>Mostar Statute</b>	<b>Brcko Statute</b>
Territorial division of power	C	I
Rules of representation		
- Electoral system	C	C
- Ethnicity based	C	I
Veto mechanism	C	I

In sum, the institutional system in Mostar can be seen as a consociational one, and hence be placed within the consociational paradigm. On the other hand, the structures in Brcko included several principles emphasised in the integrative paradigm.

## **6.2 Inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko**

The initial propositions set out to test were two fundamental claims inherent in the consociational and the integrative models. The consociational claim is that an institutional structure, like the one in Mostar, would most likely contribute to inter-ethnic elite cooperation. The opposing integrative claim is that an integrative

institutional structure, like the one adopted in Brcko, would be most prone to foster inter-ethnic cooperation.

In order to test these propositions, the nature of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar from 1996-2004 and in Brcko from 2000-2004 were examined. Cooperation between elites is not a fixed variable, but through an examination of how elites behaved in the process of establishing the institutions, of how elites responded to electoral dynamics and how well the institutions in the two cities functioned, will provide a good set of indicators of the level of inter-ethnic elite cooperation.

The examination of the *establishment process* and nature of cooperation has shown that the elites in Mostar found it hard to cooperate and also obstructed the formation process through different strategies. The process was long and difficult. Institutions were first established one year after the elections, and the process was fraught with conflicts between the main nationalist parties HDZ and SDA. The institutional system with security guarantees had minimal influence on the behaviour and motivations of the elites. In Brcko, however, the establishment process went quickly and without obstructive actions from the elites. Institutions without group protection met surprisingly little resistance.

The examination of *electoral dynamics* and how elites responded to rules of representation, has shown that elites both in Mostar and Brcko responded inclusively, and that it was difficult to identify any differences in levels of cooperation on this point.

The examination of the *functionality* of the institutions has shown that the Brcko institutions produced a higher level of concrete output through laws and implementations, in addition to meeting permanently, while the Mostar institutions did not succeed in implementing any of the concrete tasks it was outlined to perform. They did not convene permanently. This indicates that elites in Brcko more easily cooperated than in Mostar, despite of the lack of security mechanisms and within a

system containing the integrative mechanisms mentioned by Horowitz. The mechanisms in the Mostar, however, did not seem to spur cooperative motivations.

Based on these findings the initial integrative claim seems to be supported. Elites cooperated more actively and with less conflict in Brcko than in Mostar. The security mechanism Lijphart prescribes did little to unite the elites in Mostar. However, the findings also suggest that devising institutional structures that can accommodate the needs of elites from different ethnic groups after a civil war, is a difficult task. Trust and cooperation, regardless of institutional design, are factors that need time to develop.

It must be mentioned that it is likely that international actors also are an influencing factor in these processes. On the one hand, the international community can create security and be a support. On the other hand, the international community can dominate political life and make the elites less important actors. In both cases, it is likely to assume that international actors will effect the incentives and motivations for elites to cooperate.

### **6.3 Institutional structure, international involvement and elite cooperation**

Horowitz and Lijphart's models were developed in a different context than the pre-civil war environment of the 1990s. As this examination shows, institutional structure is not the only point effecting inter-ethnic cooperation. In examining elite cooperation and institutional structure a wider frame than the one the consociational and integrative structure offer is needed, because a number of factors affect this relationship.

While the international actor dimension is completely ignored in both Lijphart's and Horowitz' assumptions of elite behaviour and responses to institutional structure, the comparison of inter-ethnic elite cooperation in Mostar and Brcko has found that this factor is likely to interfere in the interplay between institutional structure and inter-ethnic relations. This does not make the different institutional power-sharing institutions proposed by integrativists or consociationalists less valid, but speaks in

favour of the need to critically examine, possibly revise and expand the assumptions concerning elite behaviour the models are vested on. Such a revision is, however, not the purpose of this thesis. Suffice to say here is that international actors are likely to be engaged in future operations that are aimed at creating stability and peace and will continue to be influenced by the writings of Lijphart and Horowitz. Institutional structures in close resemblance to their model are likely to be devised also for future post-civil war societies.

## 7. Bibliography

Bieber, Florian (2005) 'Local Institutional Engineering: a Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 12 (3), pp. 420-433

Bose, Sumantra (2002) *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*, London: Hurst and Company

Bosnia and Herzegovina Election Commission (2004). Election Results for Brcko 2004

elections, <http://www.izbori.ba/documents/Rezultati%20izbora%202004/Utvrdjeni/2004SkupstinaBrcko.pdf>, read 4 January 2004

Brcko Arbitral Tribunal (1999a) Final Award. Vienna, Brcko Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area

Brcko Arbitral Tribunal (1999b) Annex to Final Award. Brcko Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area

Brcko Statute (2000) Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 December 1999. Read 4 January 2005: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/archive>

Carley, Patricia (1997) *U.S Responses to Self-Determination Movements: Strategies for Non-violent Outcomes and Alternatives to Secession*, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace

Carnegie Project for Complex Power-Sharing and Self-Determination (2001/2002) ECMI, read 27 March 2005: <http://www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk/centre/cps/about.html>

Caspersen, Nina (2004) 'Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? Comparison of Conflict-Regulating Strategies in Postwar Bosnia', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41 (5), pp. 569-588

Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar (2003) Recommendations of the Commission Report of the Chairman. 15 December, read 27 March 2005: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

Dahlman, Carl and Gerhard Toal (2004) *Territorial Conflict and Displaced Populations: the International Supervision of Brcko, Bosnia*, Manuscript presented at the Conference on Territorial Conflict Management, University of Illinois, 1-3 October 2004

EU Ombudsman Decision (1996). Decision on the validity of the Mostar 1996 municipality results, July 6, read 7 November 2004: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

Farrand, Robert (2006) *E-mail Interview with Author*. 5. April 2006

Gallagher, Tom (2003) *The Balkans after the Cold War, From Tyranny to Tragedy*. London and New York: Routledge

Geneva Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 6 April 1994

GFAP (1995) Annex to the Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Agreed Principles for the City of Mostar, 10 November 1995- read 6 August 2005, [http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content\\_id=380](http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380)

Gurr, Robert (1993) *Minorities at Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press

Harris, Peter and Benjamin Reilly (eds.) (1998) *Democracy in Deep-rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (1998) 'The Western States as Paradigm', *Society*, 35 (July/August): 21-25

Horowitz, Donald (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press

Horowitz, Donald (1997) 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy and Law' in Shapiro, Ian and Will Kymlicka (eds.) *Ethnicity and Group Rights*, New York: New York University Press, pp. 421-463

Horowitz, Donald (1991a) *A Democratic South-Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press

Horowitz, Donald (1991b). 'Making Moderation Pay: the Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management', in Joseph Montville (ed.), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books

HR (1997) 7<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, October 16. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (1999a) 14<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, July 16. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (1999b) 15<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, November 1. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (2000) 17<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, October 17. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (2001) 19<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, July 18. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (2002) 21<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, March 5. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (2003) 24<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, October 13. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

HR (2005) 28<sup>th</sup> Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, November 17. Read 4 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/>

Interim Statute (1996) Interim Statute of the City of Mostar, 20 February 1996, *Official Gazette of the City of Mostar*, No. 1

ICG (2000a). *Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress*. ICG Balkans Report no. 90., Sarajevo / Washington / Brussels, 19 April. Read 6 August 2005: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1242&l=1>

Jeong, Ho-Won (2005) *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Jervis, Robert (1978) 'Cooperation under the security Dilemma' *World Politics*, January

Kaldor, Mary (2001) *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Karnavas, Michael (2003). 'Creating the Legal Framework of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina: a Model for the Region and Other Post-conflict Countries', *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 97 (1), pp. 111-131

Kaufmann, Chaim (1998) 'When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century', *International Security*, vol. 23(fall), pp. 120-156



Kaufmann, Chaim (1996). 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security*, vol. 20:4 (spring), pp. 136-175

Kaufmann, Chaim (1999) 'When All Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Conflict' in J.Snyder and B. Walter (eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, New York, pp. 221-260

Kumar, Radha (1997) 'The Troubled History of Partition', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76(January/February), pp. 22-34

Lijphart, Arend (1969) 'Consociational Democracy', *World Politics*, 4(1), pp. 207-225

Lijphart, Arend (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press

Lijphart, Arend (1990) 'The Power-Sharing Approach', in Joseph Montville (ed.), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 491-509

Lijphart, Arend (1994) 'Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South-Africa', in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, London: James Currey, pp. 221-231.

Lijphart, Arend (2002) 'The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy', in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Lijphart, Arend (2004) 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies'. *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15(2), pp. 96-109

Lynghjem, Finn (2006). *Telephone Interview with Author*. 17. April 2005

Mearsheimer, John and Stephan Van Evera (1995) 'When Peace means War' *New Republic*.

Mønnesland, Svein (1999) *Før Jugoslavia og etter*, Oslo: Syppress forlag

OHR (2000c). Speech by the Supervisor of Brčko , Robert W. Farrand, at the Inaugural Session of the Interim Assembly of Brčko District, 31 March 2000. Read 5 March 2005: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/archive.asp?m=&yr=2000>

OHR Press Release (2000a) 'Establishing the Interim Brčko Assembly', 21 March 2000. Read 5 April 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/archive.asp?m=&yr=2000>

OHR Press Release (2000b) 'Supervisor Appoints Interim Election Commission of the Brcko District', 26 May 2000. Read 5 April 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/pressr/archive.asp?m=&yr=2000>

OHR Press Release (2002) 'Second Anniversary for Brcko District', 8 March 2002. Read 5 April 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/pressr/archive.asp?m=&yr=2002>

OHR Media Round Up (2000a) 'New City Government Appointed in Mostar', *Habena*, 24 June. Read 3 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

OHR Media Round Up (2003) 'Two accounts still function in City Administration', *Dnevni List*, 9 October. Read 5 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

OHR Media Round Up (2004) 'Mirsad Djapo is a mayor, Milan Tomic is an assembly speaker', *Dnevni List*, 9 December. Read 6 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

OHR Media Round Up (2005a) 'It is important there are no critics with regard to national composition' *Oslobodjenje*, 4 January. Read 6 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

OHR Media Round Up (2005b) 'Government's proposal endorsed', *Oslobodjenje*, 19 January. Read 7 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

OHR Media Round Up (2005c) 'Mayor Djapo appointed the Government', *Oslobodjenje*, 2 January. Read 7 February 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/index.asp>

O'Leary, Brendan, Ian S. Lustick and Thomas Callaghy (eds.) (2001) *Right-sizing the State: The Politics of moving borders*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

O'Leary, Brendan (2005) 'Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments', in Sid Noel (ed.) *From Power-Sharing to Democracy*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press

OSCE (2000) Municipal Elections 2000. Read 20 August 2005: <http://www.oscebih.org/documents/94-eng.pdf>

OSCE (1997) Municipal Elections 1997.Final results. Read 21 August 2005: <http://www.oscebih.org/documents/93-eng.pdf>

Paris, Roland (2004) *At War's End: Buidling Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

PIC (2000) Communique by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, Sarajevo, 13 July. Read 13 November 2005: <http://www.ohr.int/pic/archive.asp?sa=on>

Posan, Barry (1993) 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict' *Survival*, vol. 35(spring)

Ragin, Charles (1989) *The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Reichel, Sarah (2000) *Transitional Administrations in former Yugoslavia: a Repetition of Failures or a Necessary Learning Process towards a Universal Peace-building Tool after Ethno-political War?*, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, working group international politics. Read 13 October 2005: <http://www.wz-berlin.de>

Reilly, Benjamin (2002) 'Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios: Constraints and Dangers', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 9(2), pp. 118-139

Sambanis, Nicholas (2000) 'Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: an Empirical Critiques of the Theoretical Literature', *World Politics*, vol. 52 (July), pp. 437-483

Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) *The Death of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin Books.

Sisk, Timothy (1996) *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, New York: United States Institute for Peace.

Supervisory Order (2000a) Supervisory Order on the Establishment of the Interim District Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 March 2000.  
Read 5 January 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/>

Supervisory Order (2000b) Supervisory Order on the Appointment of members of the Interim Government of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, March 8.  
Read 5 January 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/>

Supervisory Order (2000c) Supervisory Order on the Appointment of Members of the Interim District Assembly of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, March 21.  
Read 5 January 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/>

Supervisory Order (2000d) Addendum to the Supervisory Order on the Appointment of Members of the Interim Government of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 26. Read 5 January 2006: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/>

Supervisor Report (2004) Report from the Supervisor of Brcko to the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board. On the Progress of Implementation of the

Final Award of the International Arbitral Tribunal for Brcko, March 18. Read 2 February 2006: [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/default.asp?content\\_id=33100](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/default.asp?content_id=33100)

Tullberg, Jan and Birgitta Tullberg (1997) 'Separation or Unity? A model for Solving Ethnic Conflicts', *Politics and the Life Sciences*, 16 (September), pp. 237-249

Yin, Robert (2003) *Case Study Research. Design and Method.*, Applied Social Research Methods Series Vol. 5. Third Edition. London: Sage Publications

Woodward, Susan (1995) *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.* Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution

## 8. Appendix


## Appendix 1: Map of BiH



Source: University of Texas, Map Library. Accessed 16 Mai 2006:

[http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/bosnia\\_pol\\_2002.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/bosnia_pol_2002.jpg)

## Appendix 2: Detailed map of Mostar



Source: <http://xoomer.virgilio.it/gianni.ridino/understand%20bosnia.htm>




### Appendix 3: Map, District of Brcko



Source: <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/93/Brcko02.png>



## Appendix 4: Institutional structure, Mostar



**Appendix 4: Institutional structure, Brcko**